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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army and Commander
in Chief of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area during the Second World War,
and those acting under his purview, did knowingly and deliberately engage in a campaign
of misinformation – during and after the war – with the intention of enhancing his
reputation. The goal of this campaign was twofold: He would secure enough popular
support to make him politically unassailable at the time and he would protect his legacy
for posterity. Unlike previous surveys, which fail to hold MacArthur accountable for the
deep and pervasive vein of propagandistic fallacy which he-and-his inserted into the
historical narrative, this study puts lie to the defense that his actions were the innocent
idiosyncrasies of a colorful eccentric, the aloofness of an old man, or the fault of loyal but
unprompted subordinates.
Thorough examination of contemporary records and accounts are used to establish
– beyond a reasonable doubt – that MacArthur understood both the reality of the
situations in question and what he stood to gain by reporting otherwise. Analysis of the
historiography concerning MacArthur was conducted and is herein summarized to
establish both that his efforts were effective, pervasive, and distinct in both quantity and
scope from the level of self-aggrandizement undertaken by his peers. As there exists far
too much literature, both primary and secondary, on which this study could focus for
comprehensive analysis in a work of this type, this study has focused primarily on two
periods between December 1941 and May 1942 – the Clark Field Attack and the
vi

Evacuation from Corregidor – to establish a pattern of behavior demonstrative of
conscious action, malicious and selfish intent, and tangible benefit. This work aims to
serve as a realization – one nearly a century in the making – of the yearning by historians,
servicemen, officials, victims, and voyeurs for a time and a method to declare openly that
one of America’s most venerated heroes was a fraud.
This work is composed in hope that the glory and acclaim he stole might be
returned to those whose blood bought the veneration with which he showered himself. It
is written in hope that historians might free themselves from the fear of repercussions
implicit in holding a man Franklin Delano Roosevelt once called “The most dangerous
man in America” accountable for his lies. And it is published in the hope that the
vainglorious denizens of the future may yet come to see Douglas MacArthur as a
cautionary tale rather than a figure for emulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Accusations
General Douglas MacArthur begins his memoir Reminiscences with a pair of
enticingly contradictory statements. He first prefaces his work with the notion that it is
neither history nor biography, but rather merely his recollection of events in which he
played a part. A few lines down the page he backtracks somewhat by informing the
reader that the following pages are filled with information carefully obtained from staff
studies, memoranda, and historical work made under his own supervision. The next
paragraph is a single standalone sentence in which MacArthur declares an overwhelming
desire to recount “… my [MacArthur’s] share in the many vital events while not giving
my [MacArthur’s] own acts an unwarranted prominence.” It is a conviction which, while
noble in isolation, holds water about as well as a hula hoop when faced with any context.
MacArthur clearly states, just three sentences earlier, in just the second sentence of his
book, that he had engineered the construction of both historical resources and historical
writings discussing the events he involved himself in. As the rest of the memoir leaves in
little doubt, MacArthur entertained no doubts about the central – and heroic – role he
played. 1
A passing egotism and a bit of false modesty is hardly a scandalous trait in an
aged and retired general looking back at a long and incredibly successful life. MacArthur

1

Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1964), v-vi.
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was, after all, weeks from death when he completed Reminiscences. However, it is the
second sentence, again, to which a historian skeptical about MacArthur’s energetic tale of
dashing heroics and success against the odds is instinctively drawn. The clue that starts
the whole treasure hunt, the thread the idle scholar pulls that pulls apart the great tapestry,
is given in the last fifteen words of the second sentence – especially the last six. “… a
free use of staff studies and historical records made under my direction and supervision.”
As this study will argue and ultimately demonstrate: MacArthur, and those working at his
behest, did not merely record a history of his role in events, but rather deliberately
created – in real time – a history that prioritized the painting of MacArthur in the most
favorable light above any and all concerns for historical (or contemporary) accuracy. 2
This willfully contradictory yet entirely official history paints MacArthur’s
enemies as the villains, his own mistakes as the fault of others, and the success made in
spite of MacArthur as his own. Most interestingly, these works are official records –
apparently unbiased primary sources – and have therefore been relied upon heavily by
historians of every caliber studying the War in the South Pacific. 3 The result are two

Ibid.
This work is not intended as an attack on historians who have relied heavily on sources that are today
controversial. Many key histories on the subject were published many decades before the time of this
writing and information – especially in terms of access – has never been in greater abundance than at
present. This work is also not necessarily an attack on MacArthur, at least not directly. Instead, this is an
examination of the effects of his historiographical meddling and that done on his behalf. To fault or belittle
historians who utilized sources they good reason to believe accurate is not the goal of this paper, nor is the
intention to shame them for refusing to make provocative accusations towards one of the most heavily
venerated men in American history. The field of Second World War History is surprisingly shallow in
terms of primary operational documentation and historians are very dependent on access to these limited
sources. Were a historian to alienate others with overt assaults on an American hero, especially in the midto-late twentieth century, there is every chance that they would quickly find themselves short on both
access to these sources and access to anyone interested in helping them correct that. John McCarten, a
respected journalist, created a brief scandal with his January 1944 article criticizing elements of
MacArthur’s leadership and decrying the MacArthur mythos as an invention of hyper-nationalists. His
sentiments were broadly accurate, and had his work been published thirty years later he might have been
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subtly, but significantly, contradictory narratives forming a dividing line between
historians of the period. In one camp are historians who, deliberately or not, utilize and
trust material created by MacArthur and his partisans. In the other are those who are
skeptical about these materials and the motivations of their creators. The former camp
tends to offer analysis of the War in the Pacific that paints MacArthur in a favorable
light, while the latter often find themselves neutral or even outright hostile towards the
man. These disparate camps enable the perception of the broad, historical discussion as a
debate over interpretation of evidence rather than an investigation of invented evidence
which, in turn, lends credibility to the suspect materials.
In a very real respect, this work is a study on the dangers to a historiography
posed by a limited pool of primary resources. The documentation produced under the
guidance of Douglas MacArthur was, as would be expected of the documentation
produced by any large military headquarters, broadly competent in design, logistical in
subject, and boring in consummation. It is within this metaphorical sea of dull
competence that individual misleading documents lie – like mines waiting to sink an
unknowing historian. While the records produced by MacArthur and his headquarters are
unavoidable and important primary resources for a historian undertaking a detailed study
of the Pacific War, they might be best approached with the healthy skepticism most often
afforded memoirs. Indeed, one does not need to look very far to find a military veteran
who will happily cast doubt on the infallibility of official military documentation.

considered one of the pioneers of a more balanced view of MacArthur. Instead, he was roundly denigrated,
and thereafter found work only as a film and theatre critic.
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Perhaps, in this vein, this is a healthy attitude to adopt in all cases where one set of
primary sources occupy a position of unavoidability within a field.
Gaming the Dialectic
Few historical figures embody so stark and enduring a split to their memories as
Douglas MacArthur. Amongst those who do engender such controversy, fewer still were
not themselves the heads of their respective states. Napoleon Bonaparte, for example,
attracts a variety of opinions as a historical figure and was no stranger to selfaggrandizement, but even his most ardent partisans accede to the historical consensus that
his position and the power it provided enabled (perhaps even demanded) a significant
editing of his profile.4 Adolf Hitler, another era-defining figure, engaged in numerous
campaigns of self-aggrandizement, but one would struggle to find a modern historian
who views the myth of Hitler’s military genius as anything other than easily debunked
propaganda. 5 These figures also, critically, lost their respective empires at the hands of
those with no particular interest in defending their projected images. MacArthur, on the
other hand, ostensibly commanded no such imperial propaganda apparatus. He was not
an all-powerful unitary executive, but instead himself a subordinate to at least two people
and, critically, was on the winning side. Either factor in isolation would retard inquisition
into his public caricature, but combined they seem to have rendered him, for a time,

Colin Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, (New York:
Routledge, 2007), 47.
5
The contrast with Napoleon and Hitler is intended not to draw untoward parallels with either figure and
MacArthur, but rather to emphasize that the powers implicit to their positions encourage a level of
historical skepticism often absent from the study of men in “lesser” positions.; German generals wrote at
length following the war about Hitler’s tendency to intervene in military strategy to the detriment of the
war effort. Martin van Creveld, an Israeli military historian and theorist, wrote at length on this theme in a
1988 article. Martin van Creveld, “On Learning from the Wehrmacht and Other Things,” Military Review,
no. 68 (1988): 69-71, 71n9.
4
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nearly unassailable. He therefore elicits two dialectical schools of thought – each
dutifully championed by careful and capable historians – which leaves an uncomfortable
incongruity in the historical narrative. The man was either a military genius who almost
singlehandedly won the Pacific War as he expertly fended off Japanese aggression with
one hand and partisan backbiting by embittered rivals with the other or he was a cynical,
self-aggrandizing buffoon with a penchant for taking credit for the deeds of his
subordinates and who grew fat on his father’s name. Primary evidence exists that
supports each idea, and each can call among its ranks of defenders respected and capable
historians. That a character as grandiose as MacArthur would attract both praise and
criticism from historians is not in itself particularly novel. That MacArthur both actively
worked to fabricate primary historical evidence bolstering his image and occupied a
position which protected him from significant scrutiny on the matter is, on the other hand,
quite novel indeed.
As with most cases where a historical figure is plagued by a dialectic narrative,
the likeliest truth rests somewhere in the middle. Historical consensus, if there is such a
thing, is slowly moving towards the idea that MacArthur was a commander who was
neither particularly inspired in his brilliance nor devious in his stupidity, but rather a
reasonably adept military and political mind with a calculated and meticulous disinterest
in leaving opportunities for the enhancement of his reputation on the metaphorical table.
While it is probably accurate to suggest that both his successes and failures were
enunciated by his colorful personality, this is not the argument being made here. That a
“great” historical figure might attract disparate analysis is neither novel nor shocking.
Indeed, a historical figure comprehensively cleared of controversy would be a curiosity in
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and of itself. The argument being made in this thesis is that MacArthur, fully
understanding the gravity of his place in history and the unique nature of the opportunity
presented to him, utilized his position, the assets his position provided, and the media of
his time to deliberately craft a historical narrative which was both unabashedly favorable
towards himself and academically valid.
You Miss 100% of the Shots You Don’t Take
“Great Men,” to resurrect a somewhat gauche historical moniker, tend to be very
cognizant of their place in history. Alexander the Great was supposed to have kept in his
travelling party a large number of scribes assigned to record his actions so no part of his
“greatness” would be missed by either his subjects or by posterity. Julius Caesar
published his accounts of his adventures in Gaul with one eye on raising his profile in
Rome and another firmly on cementing his place in history. Kings and Emperors from
Solomon to Saddam Hussein took advantage of the media of their day to see that history
recorded their accomplishments and a series of writers with a strong, if slightly
unprofessional, bias towards keeping their heads attached to their shoulders ensured that
the narrative which they produced painted their respective employers in a favorable
light. 6 Douglas MacArthur, however, was neither a King nor an Emperor. As much as he
may at times have wished it, he could not have an unfavorable press rounded up and
drowned in a lake. He was instead presented with a very specific set of circumstances that
allowed him an amount of personal control over a historical narrative almost

Peter Green, Alexander the Great and The Hellenistic Age, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007), xxiixxviii.
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unprecedented for a man of his position – not the least of which being a position to which
such powers are not expected to fall.
The field of history is much like the field of law. Events, at least those involving
people, either happen or do not happen and are accordingly recorded with relative ease.
There is a similar lack of debate among historians in regard to the, say, founding of Zion
National Park in Utah as there would be among crime scene investigators over the
existence of a cadaver over which they were standing. There are exceptions and
qualifications, there always are, but broadly the question that consumes the bulk of time
and energy is one of motivation. In history as in law, motivation is proved most often
through analysis of an aggregate collection of factors. Small pieces of evidence are
accrued and organized before an argument can then be made and defended. Notes from a
murderer detailing their crime, intention, and methodology are somewhat rarer than
television would have you believe.
The same is the case in history at large and with this argument in particular. There
exists no damning memorandum from Douglas MacArthur in which he orders the blatant
falsification of reports – at least none that have yet been discovered. Nor is there much
discourse from his sycophants (though there is not none) so much as implies an intention
to repackage events in a more favorable manner. It is therefore left to us to engage in a
broader survey of both the historiography at large and contemporary reporting and couple
our findings with an evident pattern of behavior. Through this wider lens we might
discern a pattern of bias, omission, and misrepresentation that through its consistency
serves for us the same purpose as the collected evidence of the crime scene investigator.

8
Why it Matters
There is a temptation to look at the past with a sense of superiority. It is, in
fairness, not an entirely unmerited prejudice. The documentation of the lessons learned
by and through the failures and discoveries of previous generations is arguably the single
greatest utility of the written word. It stands to reason those mistakes, deceptions, and
misunderstandings suffered by those who came before, once identified, cannot be
repeated. This fallacy is both entirely understandable and extremely dangerous. In the
case of Douglas MacArthur, a rare, but not necessarily irreplicable, set of circumstances
conspired to protect his legacy from the inquisition usually visited upon those who
attempt to rewrite history.
First, and perhaps least intuitively, MacArthur lived for a very long time.
Controversial figures of his stature very rarely live long enough to witness the historical
discussion of their legacy. George Patton, a man five years younger than MacArthur, was
dead within months of the end of the war that etched his name into history. Rommel,
Yamamoto, and McNair, to name just a handful of his contemporaries, failed even to
survive the war. Other men, among them Eisenhower, Montgomery, Chiang, Zhukov,
and Konev, survived the war but continued to act as major figures in the creation of new
history for decade. These men – several of whom will be examined in more detail in a
later chapter – were, either by disposition, responsibility, or the relative security of their
positions, not particularly focused on the careful and curatorial defense of their own
histories. 7 MacArthur, following his escapades in Korea and a final botched attempt at

Churchill, of course, offers a very plausible exception to this point, but the circumstances and motivations
surrounding his retellings of his own history are different enough from MacArthur’s own to free him (at
least for the purposes of this work) from accusations of a parallel nature. Examination of Churchill’s life,
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the Republican presidential nomination, lingered for more than a decade – a decade in
which he neither held nor was in a position to seek political or military power, but one in
which he still wielded a great deal of influence as to how the history of the events in his
life could be recorded.
Secondly, and very unusually for a man with superiors, the primary curator of the
historical primary sources concerning General Douglas MacArthur was… General
Douglas MacArthur. He, as he proudly boasts in his writing, and those in his debt or
service created many of the records historians would use to understand and interrogate
the events that made him a household name.8 As a younger officer, MacArthur had been
a pioneer in press relations. As an old general, MacArthur was in his time unrivalled in
his ability to treat the press not as an adversary or a neutral institution, but as a tool in
one’s own arsenal. 9 He was blessed with such distance from what few forces could
practicably supersede his authority that he was able to exert a level of control over the
flow of information almost unprecedented for a man of his station.
Finally, MacArthur was an American hero. Whether the deeds that granted him
such reverence were real, embellished, or outright fabricated – whether he had achieved
such veneration through the excitable enthusiasm of an epic poet or the bitter
manipulations of an arch cynic – he was nonetheless a hero to many Americans. Men in
positions of significant authority in the military and government owed him significant

actions, and motivations is a task that this author feels, at the moment, is best left to his more than sixhundred biographers. Though there is a dry amusement to be quietly shared here in the reflection that few
of those writers would describe the task as anything more than “woefully incomplete.”
8
MacArthur, Reminiscences, v-vi.
9
D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur Volume 1, 1880–1941, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970),
130-135.
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debt for their positions – and in some cases lives – and many Americans saw him as the
man who had answered when they cried out as a nation for a hero. Any historian who
made the decision to attack his legacy, especially during his life, would likely have faced
significant backlash both personally and professionally. Even his critics – of which his
biographer Arthur Herman (somewhat defensively) notes MacArthur attracted many in
the decades since his death – refrain from accusing MacArthur outright of maliciously
lying.10
The time has, however, come to change that. The time of MacArthur and the men
working on his behalf is long past and while he still has partisans, they are no longer
ubiquitous. It is now, in the clear air offered by eight decades of breathing room, that it
must be said openly and without qualification that MacArthur was a hero only to himself.
His is a legacy that was invented – and invented for his own aggrandizement. To allow
his myth to continue to perpetuate – to allow his legacy to be free of specific judgement –
is to establish a precedent for other vain, ambitious men to follow. In a field in which
reputations are inextricably linked to credibility, this is unacceptable.
Setting the Stage
On Japanese Otherness
It would be remiss to not mention, at least briefly, the role that race plays in the
events discussed herein. While there is no indication that MacArthur was, himself,
especially racist (by the admittedly despicable standards of his day) the prevailing racism
held by many of his countrymen likely contributed to both increased fear of and
decreased sympathy for the forces arrayed against him. The Japanese were felt by many

10

Arthur Herman, Douglas MacArthur American Warrior, (New York: Random House, 2017), 844-847.
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Americans at the time to be sub-human and tales of their deaths failed to arouse the same
level of sympathy that the killing of white people did. In the ascendency, however, they
were supposed to be unspeakably savage. By the early twentieth century, Japan had a topclass navy and army, an extractive colonial infrastructure, and the begrudging respect of
other powerful nations - every trait of a first-rate power of the day.
Perhaps, however, it is more honest to say that Japan had every trait save two,
both of which are important factors in the creation of the unique experience of the Pacific
War. First, the Japanese were not, and indeed still are not, white. The other major world
powers of the age were all Anglo-European, with shared cultural roots and a long history
of interconnection. In a world where race was perceived as more important than it is
today, and where racialist ideals gained wider acceptance, this made the Japanese an
“other” in relation to the rest of the great powers. Make no mistake, a narcissistic
delusion of genetic superiority was every bit as pervasive in Japanese society as it was in
other cultures at the time, but Westerners with a vested interest in doing so had little
trouble painting the Japanese as something slightly less than human.11
The second place where the Japanese found themselves just outside of the Great
Powers club was in terms of resources. Though adaptive farming practices and extensive
fisheries allowed the archipelago to support a large population, the Japanese Home
Islands produced very little in the way of key fuels and metals. Japan was therefore
forced to import the vast majority of its oil, coal, natural gas, copper, gold, and iron. As
these are the building blocks of a modern industrialized military – a nonnegotiable

Maury Klein, A Call to Arms: Mobilizing America for World War II, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013),
611.
11
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prerequisite to being a colonizer rather than the colonized – the Japanese spent heavily on
them. This was, however, unsustainable and the need for resource security conspired with
a handful of cultural idiosyncrasies to drive the Japanese to further colonial expansion.12
In part because the established colonial powers had no interest in enabling a new
rival, in part because of a sense of racial superiority, and in part due to the sheer brutality
and cruelty of the Japanese adventures in Asia and the Pacific, by the end of the 1930s
the other great powers of the world had begun levying punitive economic sanctions on
the Japanese. 13 By 1941, Germany and Italy – the two major powers sympathetic to Japan
– were meeting with military success in Europe but were confined there. The United
Kingdom and United States, already heavily sanctioning the Japanese, demanded that
Japan withdraw from the territory they had spent vast amounts of blood, treasure, and
time to pry from their neighbors or else see the flow of resources – already little more
than a trickle – cut off entirely. This would starve the Japanese military, leaving it unable
to operate effectively and forever inferior to the other great powers. 14
The Empire, therefore, found itself at a crossroads. Either it could bow to the
other powers and accept a subservient position in return for restarting the flow of

12
The term “Home Islands” has largely been replaced in Western parlance by “Japanese Archipelago.”
The archipelago consists of Hokkaido in the north, Honshu in the center, Shikoku in the south, and Kyushu
to the southwest, and it has a total of 6,852 islands (of which 430 are inhabited). The Ryukyu Islands (of
which Okinawa is the largest) and Kuril Islands are also sometimes counted as parts of the archipelago.
Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War 1931-1945, (New York: Random House, 1978), 133-135.
13
While the Empire of Japan was amazingly cruel in its colonial conquests, their cruelties did not
meaningfully exceed the worst examples of actions that their European rivals had engaged in during their
early colonial adventures. They were, however, hamstrung by a global intellectual tradition that was just
beginning to take a negative view of such practices. While Japanese incredulity at being reprimanded for
the same sort of conduct which had made their critics mighty is not entirely unfair – their general failure to
earnestly adapt to and embrace the changing tenor of global public opinion made their demonization by
Allied propogandists a matter of little difficulty. Ibid, 135.
14
Edward Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945, (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1991), 19-38.
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resources – a position that was itself probably not politically possible domestically or
internationally – or it could take them by force. Sensing a unique opportunity in the
perceived weakness and distraction evident in the other powers, they opted for the latter.
A series of surprise attacks against American and British possessions in Malaysia,
Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Hawaii were followed by a declaration of
war. It would be a dirty war – appalling and cruel both in its vastness and in its minutiae
– and it would be a desperate war. It would be a theatre in which nations would rise and
sing their own epitaphs and a theatre in which a man, if he were clever, powerful, and
ambitious enough, might write his name into history.
Economies of Scale make Fools of Us All
There are few endeavors more complicated than a modern war. When Alexander
the Great crossed the Hellespont in 334BCE he did so with a force somewhere between
forty and fifty thousand men. That the Roman Republic was able to mass perhaps eighty
thousand at Cannae in a desperate bid to stop Hannibal Barca was due in no small part to
the situation not requiring that they be supplied for very long, moved anywhere, or –
ultimately fatefully – given any meaningfully complex tactical instructions. The Friday
before the United States found itself a surprised and unhappy belligerent in the Second
World War marked the official end of Operation Barbarossa, the name given for the
general invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany.
Barbarossa had seen nearly four million personnel, seven thousand tanks and
fighting vehicles, five thousand aircraft, twenty-four thousand artillery pieces, eighteen
thousand mortars, six-hundred thousand horses, and as many light vehicles. Millions
more people manufactured the sundry materiel of war, grew the millions of tons of food

14
the armies consumed, manned the rail lines that sent goods east, or staffed hospitals that
received their bloody progeny. A staff of thousands of highly trained, highly motivated
experts oversaw the movement and organization of the necessities of an industrial war
machine that had been unimaginable in their own lifetimes. It was also entirely
insufficient.15
By December 5, 1941, Barbarossa had failed. The ramifications of its failure
would not be apparent for some time and the cost in human lives was little more than a
sample of the horror to come, but the combined attentions of the military, industrial, and
economic engines of an ascendent and battle tested nation that had at this point come to
control most of Europe had failed to achieve success in an endeavor against an enemy
they had taken by surprise and with whom they shared a land border stretching nearly
from just north of the Hellespont to the Baltic Sea.
This is all included in an effort to contextualize the scale of the Pacific War – a
conflict that would quickly grow to include nearly half the globe in its theatre of
operations. A German soldier who had marched past the Brandenburg Gate to the suburbs
of Moscow and stood again in the shadow of the great sandstone columns as the Red
Army descended on Berlin four years later would have covered about thirty-six hundred
kilometers. Were he an American, however, and attempting a journey from the western
port city of Los Angeles to the eastern Australian city of Sydney to reinforce this key
strategic ally, he would have had to travel more than three times that distance and, of
course, he would have had to swim.

William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, (New York: Simon
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Wars are dictated, perhaps more than any other single factor, by geography.
Distance, terrain, climate, and distribution of natural resources serve as clear determining
factors in any military conflict. The War in the Pacific incorporated more geographical
factors, both in volume and depth, than any other. Where the Germans eventually failed
to defeat an enemy across a two-thousand-kilometer front, the Americans needed to
succeed against an enemy across a front more than fifteen-thousand kilometers wide.
Their supply lines were stretched over endless tracts of dangerous ocean. Their personnel
were without contact or resupply for weeks or months not by happenstance, but by
design. Where the Germans initially faced a disparate and embittered collection of Soviet
satellite states, America faced a Japanese Empire unwavering in its devotion to its
Emperor and its commitment to his cause – a Japanese Empire that had for years known
that the Americans were coming and had planned accordingly. The distinct lack of a
Japanese Empire on maps and travel brochures should stand testament to these obstacles
being eventually overcome, but as this is not a treatise on the nature of modern logistics
nor an accounting of the Pacific War. Rather, this tangent exists to impress that
something as mundane as an infantryman receiving replacement boots on Papua was
itself the product of the successes and creativity of dozens, perhaps hundreds of people.
In the face of such overwhelming systems, modern war becomes quite
mechanically impersonal. This impersonality is generally unwelcomed by the public. The
idea of such a visceral human experience – a tragedy in many cases – being an industrial
spreadsheet that consumes human lives like so many millions of units is understandably
unpalatable to people who have invested so much of their own worlds in a conflict. It is
far easier to personify and anthropomorphize armies, nations, and peoples behind the
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mask of a handful of powerful individuals. Rather than the Philippine campaign and all of
its successes, failures, victories, and capitulations being the product of many thousands of
minds and many hundreds of thousands of bodies one can simply project their intellectual
and emotional mass into one or two individuals: MacArthur and Homma, perhaps,
engaging in a vast chess match to the death. While few, if perhaps not as few as one
might hope, would uphold such a childish notion under sustained scrutiny it does hold
that most critical of qualities for an idea to be powerful: it is easy to embrace.
This semi-deliberate occlusion of the minutiae of history gives massively
disproportionate power to the figures chosen to represent these groups and events both
contemporarily and in the historical narrative. Many figures shy away from this attention
to a greater or lesser degree. They fall back on formality, discipline, and an abstract sense
of duty as they politely decline the attention. Others, in contrast, revel in their perceived
ubiquity; from Napoleon to Bolivar to Patton, history is replete with leaders who clearly
embraced and enjoyed the caricatures painted of them by friendly media. MacArthur
leaned into this phenomenon and, in the immortal words of Spinal Tap guitarist Nigel
Tufnel, turned it “up to eleven.” He regularly referred to himself in his correspondence as
being “at the front” or having personally “smashed the enemy.”16 That he was writing
these words far from any fighting – thousands of miles in most cases – wasn’t of great
importance to his discourse. His was a charismatic, recognizable name with which to
simplify a vast and uncomfortable organization and that was good enough. He
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recognized, perhaps more clearly than any figure had up to that point in history, the
ability afforded by his position to utilize such narrow public perception to determine his
own place in history.
A Pattern of Behavior in Khaki Trousers
If ever there was a man born with a leg up on the competition, it was Douglas
MacArthur. Born in Arkansas in 1880, MacArthur was already an old man with a full –
and controversial – life behind him when the Japanese aircraft carriers fatefully launched
their planes towards Pearl Harbor. Of course, this is not the place for a biography nor,
accordingly, is this section included for biographical purposes. Rather, it exists to
establish a pattern of behavior significantly predating the events discussed in detail in this
work and in doing so establish a more holistic view of the man than is often offered in
discussions over his behavior. Far too frequently, MacArthur’s defenders will brush aside
examples of the General’s personal and professional failings by pointing to his apparently
sterling record as a military man. Certainly, on paper MacArthur boasts a resume with
few equals. A broader understanding of his history, however, suggests a pattern of selfaggrandizement which casts serious doubts on the veracity of his resume. This broader
understanding is further bolstered by brief introductions to his father, grandfather, and the
political capital that each attached to the MacArthur name.
His grandfather, Arthur MacArthur, had emigrated to the United States from
Scotland as a boy and had taken to the legal field, eventually earning himself a term as
lieutenant-governor (and very briefly governor) of Wisconsin before taking up a series of
judicial positions that would see him end his career in Washington D.C. with nearly two
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decades as a member of the District’s Supreme Court.17 Arthur’s son, also named Arthur,
cemented the family’s legacy when, at seventeen, Arthur Senior secured his son a
commission as a lieutenant in the 24th Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry as it headed off to
the American Civil War. The boy proved a natural soldier, and his gallantry would soon
see him breveted a colonel and awarded the Medal of Honor – distinctions both earned
before his twentieth birthday. A failed sojourn of his own into law saw young Arthur step
back into uniform within a year of the war’s conclusion and while his career slowed
during those years following the war, he nonetheless enjoyed a sparkling military career
that would culminate in a position as Governor-General of the Philippines. 18 Arthur’s
own sons, none more so than his youngest, would forever harbor a need to equal their
father’s legacy.
Douglas was intensely aware of the expectations his family name laid on his
shoulders, but seemed from an early age to be perfectly capable of living up to the high
standards set before him.19 As a young man, he worshipped his war hero father and his
power broker grandfather and there were few, if any, indications that he would pursue
any field other than politics and war. 20 He spent his early years enrolled in a series of
military schools before enjoying an extremely successful – though in his signature style
markedly controversial – stint at West Point. His status as the son of one of the Army’s
most powerful and revered generals courted as much attention as his own considerable
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achievements and each played a role in his rapid progress. Whether MacArthur had
already chosen for himself a venerated place in history is difficult to know, but he had
certainly decided that whatever his story, it must be exceptional.
As a newly minted lieutenant, Douglas was posted upon graduation to the
Philippines, the military department recently overseen by his father. 21 This assignment
provided MacArthur an anecdote he would carry for life and set the tone for his later
legend-building. While on the small island of Guimaris in 1903, so the story goes, he was
walking alone when he was ambushed by a pair of insurrectos. 22 They shot at him with a
rifle, tearing off his hat, and he returned fire with a pistol killing them both. Whether
there is any kernel of truth at all to the story is doubtful. Aside from his having been
assigned briefly to the island in question there is no evidence one way or the other
besides his word. The only witness recounted by MacArthur is an unnamed sergeant
whom he recalls arriving on the scene, saluting him, and praising him in stereotypically
illiterate jargon before disappearing into the mists of history.23 If one were to note that
the incident bore more than a passing resemblance to the “Wild West” dime novels a
young man of the time would have grown up reading, such insight would not be
misplaced. The legend of Douglas MacArthur was crying out for life, yet young Douglas
would spend much of his youth frustrated by a world largely free of the tumult.
Nonetheless, a potent concoction of connections and initiative saw MacArthur
assigned to a series of excellent posts for the development of his career and in 1914 he

Arthur MacArthur was by then the recently appointed commander of the Pacific Division.
A catch-all term enjoyed by Americans at the time to refer to innumerable separate and only occasionally
aligned Filipino separatist groups as well as bandits and other armed criminals. It is a woeful term on
several levels but is kept here as it is the word favored by MacArthur in his own account.
23
Perrett, 49.; MacArthur, 29.
21
22

20
was able to attach himself to the Veracruz expedition. He arrived in Veracruz to a
situation that had been slowed significantly by a lack of locomotives. As MacArthur tells
it, he bribed three Mexican rail workers and snuck behind Mexican lines. They found the
locomotives they needed but were themselves forced into a series of ferocious gunfights
as they got the engines back to American lines. MacArthur, ever – apparently – the
gunfighter, killed Mexican after Mexican even as bullets passed through his coat.
Geoffrey Perret, another of his many biographers, describes the report delivered by
MacArthur as akin to an adventure novel – a sentiment that is if anything underselling the
tale spun therein. Almost all of it, particularly the gunfighting, is almost certainly fiction,
but MacArthur did wind up credited with the acquisition of three locomotives.24
This, he hoped, would win him the Medal of Honor. Receipt of the decoration
was, perhaps more than any other pursuit, the greatest single desire of his first sixty years.
It is speculation, though safe speculation, that he felt the award would give him parity
with his hero father. If his story were even half-true, he would not have been wrong to
expect one. Fifty-six Medals of Honor were awarded by the military for a two-day
skirmish around the Veracruz customs house. The generous dispensation of awards
proved a scandal for the War Department and led both to the tightening of standards for
the decoration and the establishing of lower ranking medals. 25 He was not, as the
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convened board decided, to be awarded anything at all. His story was fanciful,
inconsistent, and lacked anything approaching a credible witness, but further opportunity
for glory awaited just around the corner.
While Mexico inconclusively consumed itself, war had come to Europe and,
eventually, so did America. MacArthur was key in petitioning the formation of a National
Guard unit – this would become the 42nd “Rainbow” Division – and successfully
arranged for himself a place as the formation’s Chief of Staff. This position came with a
breveted commission as a Colonel, an improvement of two ranks from his pre-war rank
of Major. This commission was also, at his insistence, in the infantry rather than his own
engineer corps. A meaningless designation for a staff officer, but one that finally gave a
thirty-seven-year-old Douglas MacArthur footing in his father’s branch. 26
MacArthur wasted little time in filling out his new infantryman’s resume with
decorations for valor. He was positively showered with awards in France not the least of
which was a further breveted promotion to Brigadier General. 27 In about seven months
MacArthur found himself the recipient of two Distinguished Service Crosses, two Croix
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de Guerre, and no fewer than seven Silver Citation Stars.28 He also picked up two Wound
Chevrons, a precursor to the Purple Heart, from German gas attacks. 29 It bothered no one,
least of all MacArthur, that these “gas attacks” had left him with remarkably little
damage or that the citations for his many awards bore no description of actual combat bar
the one in which he was apparently the sole (and miraculously unharmed) survivor of a
nighttime patrol. He had been conspicuous in his bravery when in the company of his
superiors and had maintained a campaign of breathless reporting from “the front” to his
commanders of his daily heroism. He was therefore incredulous when John Pershing,
commander of the American forces in France, flatly told him that he did not meet the
standards of heroism for the Medal of Honor.30
Unfazed, his star continued to rise after World War One. Appointed
Superintendent of West Point upon his return to the United States, a position that allowed
him to keep the rank of Brigadier General instead of suffering a return to his pre-war rank
of Major, he would follow up that position with stints in the Philippines and as the
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President of the United States Olympic Committee. 31 He would continue a steady climb
all the way to the office of Chief of Staff of the Army. MacArthur adopted a distinctive
style as Chief of Staff, dressing gaudily and presenting himself as more a caricature than
a bureaucrat. He spent lavishly on his image, surrounding himself with an ever-increasing
level of luxury. It is during this time that he started referring to himself in the third person
as “MacArthur” and contracted a public relations firm to bolster his image with the
American people.32
A unique and decorated figure, MacArthur was quickly becoming a contender for
the favor of some of the more right-wing elements of the Republican Party and interested
parties had begun to discuss the possibility of running him for President in years to come.
MacArthur would later claim that he was not one of those parties, but correspondence
between MacArthur and figures within the Washington political scene leave little doubt
in his interest. This would all change, however, in 1932 with the March of the Bonus
Army. 33
In 1932 thousands of World War One veterans, suffering hardships in the face of
the Great Depression, descended on Washington to lobby Congress to pay early bonuses
they had been promised for their service. The protests were peaceful, but Congress had
little interest in acceding to the demands of the Marchers. The Congressional session
ended without any action being taken, and district police were called to evict what
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protesters had not simply gone home in disgust. When they would not leave, the police
elected to make their point more forcefully and shot several of the protestors. To the
somewhat baffling surprise of the authorities, this instead made the demonstrators more
upset, which in turn led President Hoover to order MacArthur to use military force to
evict the Marchers. MacArthur ordered the Marchers cleared out with tanks, bayonets,
and tear gas and then made the fateful decision (against the advice of his subordinates) to
oversee the operation personally on horseback and in uniform. 34
The imagery of MacArthur bringing military force against unarmed veterans
asking for little more than relief badly damaged his reputation with the American people.
MacArthur would spend the next several years defending his battered image. In 1934 he
sued several journalists, most notably Drew Pearson, over their depiction of his treatment
of the Bonus Marchers. They in turn threatened to call as a witness his “secret” mistress,
a Filipina named Isabel Rosario Cooper, as a witness. Cooper had been fifteen at the start
of their relationship, more than three decades MacArthur’s junior, and her existence was
known only to a very few. She was probably unrelated in any way to the suit, MacArthur
did not keep her for her counsel, but her presentation would have been an unbearable
embarrassment. MacArthur quietly dropped the case and secretly paid the defendants
$15,000 for recovery of his letters to Cooper from Pearson. 35
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MacArthur retired in 1935 and accepted an offer from Philippine President
Manuel Quezon to supervise the creation of a Philippine Army. Quezon named
MacArthur Field Marshall in 1936, a position that came with a dizzying salary, a
penthouse apartment in Manila’s premier luxury hotel, and a continued link to the war
department as “Military Liaison to the Philippines,” that of course came with the salary
of a major-general. 36 MacArthur would spend the remainder of the decade lobbying
Washington for equipment, soldiers, officers, and attention, no quantity of which ever
seemed to be enough. By the dawn of the next decade, and with independence on the
horizon, the Philippine Congress began to question whether the extortionate costs
involved in keeping the American Generalissimo justified the relative lack of results. The
War Department began to ask questions as well, specifically, whether the buildup of
American personnel and war materiel in a location they knew to be indefensible in the
event of a war with Japan was particularly wise. 37
MacArthur too, it seems, was beginning to grow bored with his self-imposed, if
extremely luxurious, exile. Correspondence between MacArthur and agents in
Washington show he was keeping tabs on the field of potential Republican presidential
candidates and moreover that there was an interest by some in MacArthur joining that
field. It seems that while his heavy handedness with the Bonus Marchers had harmed his
image with the public, there were a few among the elite who felt he represented an ideal
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authoritarian strongman to provide a bulwark against the specter of communism. 38 The
1930s had, globally, been rather fruitful for right-wing men in military fatigues who had
sought higher office. Roosevelt would prove a crushingly strong candidate in 1940, but
his health was worsening, and the Republican field certainly looked open to an outsider
candidate with name recognition. 39
War delayed any such dreams. With rising tensions with Japan making war
inevitable, Washington was left with little choice but to double down on their investment
in the Philippines. In late July 1941, with war on the horizon, President Roosevelt
federalized the Philippine military and recalled MacArthur to active service as a
Lieutenant-General, a rank he would see improved by the end of the year. 40 He was the
now the Supreme Commander of Army Forces in the Far East. He had been so invested
in by the War Department in terms of men, materiel, and strategic attention that his
position – a position known to war planners to be indefensible – had to be defended. He
was, to borrow a phrase, too big to fail.
Introducing the Historiography
The core of this thesis is built around the contrast of events reported by
MacArthur’s command during and after their occurrence and events as they are now
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understood to have unfolded, that is in turn joined by demonstration of these reports
affecting the historiography. By working with reports both during and subsequent to the
events in question, both ignorance and misremembrance can be safely ruled out as
proximate causes for inaccuracy. To understand the divisive impact Douglas MacArthur
had on the historiography of the Second World War, one must first have a general
understanding of the field.
Histories of World War Two that focus on other theatres nevertheless regularly
reference, in passing, events and characters in the Pacific. As a result, these serve as
useful conduits for the perpetuation of flawed information about MacArthur and the
Pacific. A historian will, after all, rarely vet their tangential anecdotes with the same
keenness they reserve for the objects of their study. Historians often utilize the secondary
works of other historians when introducing contextual information. This, in itself, is a
necessary acquiescence to the realities of narrow expertise and limited time.
Unfortunately, this can have the unintended effect of allowing flawed information to
become attached to the names of even very reputable historians. This has the occasional,
but persistent, repercussion of bolstering MacArthur’s preferred historiography as
apparently being adopted by authors without a strong bias towards or against him.
The historiography of the Pacific War is itself often subdivided among military
historians. The clearest of these divisions is into two categories: naval histories and
histories that are not explicitly naval.41 The former has, again, fewer obvious connections
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with the story of MacArthur and would initially seem candidates to be set to one side for
the present discussion. Naval histories, however, offer a similar opportunity to the
European histories in their tangential discussion of MacArthur and his world. MacArthur
made enemies of many Navy men and won admirers among few Marines. The quiet bias
against the General in the source material utilized by the historians focused on naval
affairs serves as an interesting parallel to the distance provided by European sources.
There are, of course, many works on land warfare of the Pacific War. It is in these
volumes that a curious dichotomy emerges. In some accountings of these events Douglas
MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Land Forces, is depicted as the (or
at the very least a) key man in planning, organizing, and personally leading a heroic
defense of the region against the Japanese, followed by a stunning reconquest. In other
accountings, MacArthur is painted as selfish, egomaniacal, and possessing a competent if
unremarkable military acumen at best and at worst an incompetence bordering on
treason. A predictive gauging of a work’s presentation of MacArthur can be drawn –
loosely – by determining whether the author relied primarily on sources influenced by the
man himself.
While it is, frankly, impossible to account here in full for all of the works on the
Second World War that in some way discuss MacArthur without an accompanying work
of at least equal volume to this, a curated introduction can provide adequate context.42
The secondary works discussed in this work are divided into two camps; those with a
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tendency to rely on primary sources produced by or in support of MacArthur, and those
that have largely eschewed those sources. As this study only concerns itself with the use
of sources such as they relate to MacArthur, few fall somewhere in the middle. Where
necessary, specific studies of logistics, materiel, or semi-related areas of the war that do
not meaningfully opine on MacArthur are utilized as foundational material to establish
the context in which decisions and reports were made. 43
Examples of secondary works highly dependent on MacArthur-based material are
common. In the years immediately following the General’s 1964 death, publications
broadly reflected the lack of open controversy over MacArthur’s accounting of events.
Reports of General MacArthur Volumes 1 &2 by his General Staff (Ed. Charles
Willoughby) (1966) and The Pacific War 1941-1945 by John Costello (1981) are just two
examples of sources which leaned heavily on the primary sources created by MacArthur
and his camp. 44 It would take time, and the gradual surfacing of contradictory evidence,
for historians to begin to distrust MacArthur-based primary evidence. Eagle Against the
Sun by Ronald Spector (1985), Kokoda by Peter Fitzsimmons (2004), The Pacific War:
The Strategy, Politics, and Players that Won the War by William Hopkins (2008), and
The Pacific Campaign in World War II by William Bruce Johnson (2010) are
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representative of a shift in the historiography towards an understanding that sources
created by MacArthur and his partisans were not always completely corroboratory with
other primary evidence. None of the aforementioned authors go so far as accusing
MacArthur of malicious deceit, but a clear split among historians had formed over the
reliability of his work. This split persists to this day, however, and reputable authors and
historians still publish work heavily reliant on the sources created by MacArthur and his
partisans. The Real History of World War II by Alan Axelrod (2008) and War at the End
of the World by James Duffy (2016) are two such works. The publication dates of these
last two works serve as a reminder of the ability of flawed resources to proliferate in a
broad field. While published works with reduced reliance on material produced by
MacArthur have become more common in recent decades, there remains a robust cohort
of modern historians with no apparent prerogative to search for sources beyond those
offered by – or heavily influenced by – MacArthur.
Biographies of MacArthur – seeing as much, or in some cases all, of their
respective scopes serve as a history of the Pacific War through the involvement of
MacArthur – are also pertinent to this discussion. As he was an influential and
captivating figure in his own time, biographies of MacArthur were not uncommon during
his life. MacArthur 1941-1951 by Charles Willoughby and John Chamberlain (1954) and
The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur by Frazier Hunt (1954) are but two examples
and, like most offerings from those years, are borderline hagiographic. More balanced
accounts appeared in the years following his death. MacArthur by Gavin Long 45 (1969),
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American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 by William Manchester (1978), and
The Years of MacArthur: Vol 1-3 by D. Clayton James (1970, 1975, 1985) represent three
of the most widely read biographies of the man. These works reflected the growing
quantity of information, and the reduced influence of MacArthur’s partisans, which is
seen again in later works like MacArthur at War: World War Two in the Pacific by
Walter Borneman (2016) and Douglas MacArthur: American Warrior by Arthur Herman
(2016). As with the broader studies of the war, however, publication date does not
necessarily reflect the perspective of the author.
Lastly, there are a handful of oddballs that do not lend themselves to easy
categorization, but demand inclusion when discussing the literature surrounding this
subject. Key examples of these are Reminiscences by Douglas MacArthur and Paul P.
Rogers’s books The Good Years and The Bitter Years. These books are ostensibly
memoirs, though in each case the author went to great pains to attest the accuracy and
academic credibility of the works. Rogers in particular put in significant work to present
his work with as many of the hallmarks of a secondary source as possible. None of the
three books belongs in the discussion of secondary literature about the war, but each is
quite clearly attempting to influence that discussion and cannot, therefore be fully
omitted from consideration.
A Brief Exposé on Representative Secondary Literature
The two-volume series Reports of General MacArthur constitutes perhaps the
most biased secondary account of the war. A preface written by the General himself

history of the war, writer of three of those volumes, and war-correspondent during the first half of the war,
his biography of MacArthur is unrelated to his previous work.
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indicates that he was unable, due to other pressing yet nebulous duties, to participate in
its publication and was instead written by those who had served on his staff – a fact
proudly emblazoned on the inside title page. His professed distance from the project is
cast in doubt by the 1966 forward written by then-Army Chief of Staff Harold K. Johnson
revealing that MacArthur’s need to continually edit “inaccuracies” and refusal to accede
to a public release prevented Reports from achieving government publication until after
MacArthur’s death. Even then, Johnson takes special care to state that “the Department of
the Army must therefore disclaim any responsibility for their accuracy.” Also damning is
the forward to the re-published 1994 edition in which Harold W. Nelson, the then-Chief
of Military History, stating the value of the work “as a detailed account from
MacArthur’s perspective of his operations … in the Southwest Pacific Area.” In each
case the admission being skirted is that the influences of MacArthur and his staff
rendered the factual viability of the work effectively nil as too many biases were present
therein to allow any information presented to be taken at face value. The kindest
descriptor of the work is to call it, as Eugene Rasor does, an account of the war from
“strictly the MacArthur-staff point of view.” 46
John Costello’s The Pacific War, published in 1981, has found a place as one of
the standard histories on the war in question. The seven-hundred page one-volume work
does well to summarize four years of events between its covers. Unfortunately, the
limited space and vast subject matter leaves Costello with little time to do much more
than summarize events. Analysis is left to a minimum and use of primary documents is
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sadly left to other historians – leading readers to track down other works to identify the
sources on which his claims are based. This is no simple task as Costello, an educated
man but not a trained historian, uses a bizarre and somewhat uncomfortable system of
notation. Once identified, his sources are mostly secondary and usually spread very thin.
In his discussion of the fall of the Philippines, for example, Louis Morton’s The Fall of
the Philippines is his only significant source. Nonetheless, the work appeals to a wide
audience – especially among readers taking their first serious steps into the subject – for
its relative approachability and represents a key piece of the historiography of the
conflict.47
John Duffy’s work War at the End of the World: Douglas MacArthur and the
Forgotten Fight for New Guinea 1942-1945 brings to light a campaign often forgotten by
Americans in the narrative of the Second World War. Notable for his usage of the official
Australian military histories in formulating his work – itself a rarity among American
historians – Duffy nonetheless manages to utilize no primary writings from Australian
soldiers, officers, or war correspondents. 48 Instead, he relies heavily on the work of other
historians and accounts from those close to MacArthur, leaving the reader with a biased
and favorable impression of the man. A similar problem faced by Alan Axelrod, a
capable historian, he nonetheless falls into the trap of repeating claims made by
MacArthur’s defenders without contest or context. His work, however engaging, well put
together, and appealing, suffers from the lack of analysis common to broad, single-
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volume histories aimed at a wide audience, in turn making it a capable vehicle for the
proliferation of biased accounts on the topic.49
William Hopkins, who experienced the Pacific War as a Marine lieutenant, makes
an explicit point of exploring Australian sources. Combining these accounts with those
from the American services, Hopkins creates a balanced accounting of the war and takes
great pains to devote attention to theatres underserved by historical analysis.50 Ronald
Spector is described as often as not as a naval historian, and was himself a Marine, albeit
in Vietnam rather than the Pacific. Though it is impossible to gauge the impact of those
biases on his decision to largely eschew MacArthur-made source material, his decision to
do so leads his work Eagle Against the Sun to be one of the works most critical of
MacArthur. 51
Australian Historian Peter Fitzsimmons offers somewhat less restraint when
discussing MacArthur. At various points in his book Kokoda, he refers to him as
“pompous,” “presumptuous,” and even “insanity in military dress,” and leaves his readers
with a picture of an arrogant, cowardly prima donna surrounded by a small “Manchu
Court” of loyal sycophants. Never is the comfort in which MacArthur lived left
unmentioned, nor his suspicious aversion to finding himself too near anything that might
possibly be described as a battlefield untouched. Whether his preference for sources other
than MacArthur’s GHQ is due to his emotional connection to the Australian servicemen
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he discusses or the historical tradition in which he was raised is unclear, but the upshot is
a heavy reliance on Australian primary and secondary sources and a fairly low opinion of
the Americans and an especially low opinion of their commander. 52
While iconoclasm is rare in studies of MacArthur, the inverse sentiment is a
popular one. It would not be unfair, in fact, to suggest that works on the man which could
be fairly categorized as hagiographic are nearly common enough to warrant their own
genre. It is unavoidable, therefore, that the biographies are as varied as the histories in
both tone and temperament. From the paranoid and defensive account offered by his onetime chief intelligence officer Charles Willoughby – read and approved, of course, by
MacArthur – to the scholarly, balanced study by Gavin Long, an Australian historian
publishing well removed by time and space from the ire of MacArthur and company. 53
The most comprehensive, spread across three volumes and 2,600 pages, is The Years of
MacArthur, 1880-1964 by D. Clayton James. The work is meticulously researched and
incorporates a dizzying array of interviews, documents, and transcripts. It is a work that
is even-handed almost to a fault. Conscious to avoid extreme positions of praise or
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damnation, his avoidance of conclusions or judgements has attracted criticism from some
corners as building a structure of excuses for MacArthur. 54
While James can be chided for his neutrality, Frazier Hunt, author of The Untold
Story of Douglas MacArthur, can enjoy a spot in the historiography entirely free of such
criticism. A longtime friend of MacArthur (Hunt had been a member of MacArthur’s
press corps during the war), to call his 1954 work – a work Hunt dedicated to
MacArthur’s son – panegyric is, somehow, to still undersell its depiction of the
General. 55 Unlike Hunt, who sought to create an impressive character, William
Manchester seeks in his book American Caesar to create an exciting book. The
information in his account is drawn heavily from James’s work with Manchester’s
contribution largely one of interpretation – a task he takes to with gusto. Manchester’s
MacArthur is an adventure in extremes, a character built of juxtapositions though one that
the author generally finds exciting and sympathetic.
A passing, if somewhat telling, interrogation can be made of MacArthur’s
biographies in their analysis of a case not studied in this paper. Inferences, if not
conclusions, can be drawn from a biographer’s willingness to broach the Isabel Rosario
Cooper scandal mentioned previously. Though neither a mark of a good nor bad work of
military history, the lascivious episode often serves as a gauge of an author’s interest in
MacArthur as a complete character. Hunt, a man with a longstanding and amicable
relationship with MacArthur, publishing while the General was very much still alive,
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ignores the issue entirely. Gavin Long mentions, briefly, the lawsuit against the
journalists in contact with her, but not Cooper herself. Borneman, Herman, and
Manchester mention Cooper by name and go into varying levels of detail about the
relationship between the two. All report that MacArthur made an error of judgement in
bringing her to America, but none imply their relationship was particularly inappropriate
or scandalous. Borneman and Herman both go out of their way to paint MacArthur as a
victim and Manchester, who goes into the most detail about the affair, describes Cooper
as a bored teenaged dilettante frustrated by the lack of attention from her lover. None
mention her age, though each is clearly aware of it – stating age differences and
describing her as “young” and “teenaged” – each is clearly working hard to avoid using
the most fitting word, “child.” MacArthur’s autobiographies, unsurprisingly, omit her
entirely.56
On Paul Rogers
Paul Rogers, MacArthur’s loyal clerk, occupies at once a critical and wholly
untrustworthy place in the understanding of Douglas MacArthur. His 1990 work The
Good Years gives an interesting insight into the inner workings of MacArthur’s
headquarters. Rogers strives immediately to lend an air of scholarly impartiality with
claims in regard to both this book and its 1991 companion piece stating, “I am a professor
and a scholar who has published widely in a very specialized area. In the writing of this
book, I have observed the established rules of my profession.” 57 However, both works are

56
Manchester, 144-145, 156; Walter Borneman, MacArthur at War: World War II and the Pacific, (New
York: Hachette, 2016), 35, 42-43; Arthur Herman, Douglas MacArthur: American Warrior, (New York:
Random House, 2017), 237-242, 249.
57
The second of the two books, The Bitter Years (1991), and very likely the first were completed and
published as Rogers was dying of cancer. (He would pass in 1992.) These memoirs, to call them what they

38
very clearly more akin to memoirs than academic studies, and no mention is made at any
point in the work that Rogers was a Professor of Economics with a focus on insurance
policies in late-Soviet Eastern Europe. An important and interesting field, no doubt, but
one which does not lend itself to an implication of historiological impartiality.
Fortunately, while likely intended as something of a secondary work, it is as a memoir
that the work adds the greatest value to this investigation.
To begin with, Rogers is clearly in awe of MacArthur even at the time of writing.
He writes of his book’s star character:
“This book is also an epic. The obvious hero is Douglas MacArthur, who evokes images
of Cid Campeador, and El Gran Capitan, and, more recently, “Marse Robert” and “Old
Jack.” The real epic hero, however, may be Corporal Mays of the 31st Infantry Regiment,
whose story is told in this book in a transcript of his own words. Mays is the infantry soldier
who drove back the Persians at Marathon and the French at Waterloo, who took Grant to
Richmond and Sherman to the sea. He is the best contemporary example I can find of
MacArthur’s enlisted counterpart, the epitome of what an infantry soldier should be.” 58

most closely resemble, are alternately claimed by Rogers to be a historical study, a heroic epic, a personal
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Rogers, despite his authoritative opining on their ideal virtues, would never fight
alongside or socialize as a peer with any infantry soldiers, a revelation that does lead one
to wonder how he came to so definitive a conclusion. 59
His hero worship extends also to the interactions he recorded or recalled between
MacArthur and other major figures. He attributed what he saw as the discomfort of
Admiral Thomas Hart in a meeting between the two in late 1941 as Hart being “cowed”
by a “superior intellect” saying, “Ordinary men are uncomfortable in the presence of
Olympian Gods.” 60 A longtime acquaintance of MacArthur and close friend of his late
older brother, Arthur III, this impression of Hart is improbable.61
On Reminiscences
Any discussion of Douglas MacArthur has, by inescapable necessity, to include
Reminiscences. Reminiscences is not a history book. Occupying a difficult to pin down
place between autobiography and candid gossip, the work is often described as a memoir.
This moniker too falls somewhat flat. Any historian whose work gives them cause to deal
in military affairs has read dozens, perhaps hundreds, of generals’ memoirs. This is
unlike any of them – and it’s not even particularly close. MacArthur’s literary offering is,
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comparatively, captivating. It reads like nothing so much as a turn of the century
adventure novel - a Victorian story where a rakish-but-dashing gentleman of the lesser
nobility galivants across exotic areas of the globe, romances the daughters of affluent
expatriates, heroically defeats a savage barbarian horde, and becomes the beloved hero of
the strange but childishly endearing locals. It is nothing short of a meandering parade of
contradictions.
It is, for a start, unavoidable. Any historian foolish enough to attempt even the
most cursory study of the Pacific War without at least a glimpse into the mind of one the
most – perhaps the most – significant figures in the history of the conflict would rightly
be stripped of their laurels. And yet, Reminiscences is perhaps the least reliable
accounting of events by a primary source since the invention of the typewriter. Whole
episodes, thrilling and nail biting in their delivery, never happened - demonstrably never
happened. Much of the rest is embellished, understated, or omitted entirely depending on
how favorably its inclusion painted the one-time Generalissimo. Nonetheless, it is
depressingly common practice among both professional and amateur historians to cite the
accounting of events laid out by MacArthur in the book, as he is often the only source
describing them. As of January 2022, MacArthur’s entry on Wikipedia, a non-academic
but highly influential repository of public history, cites Reminiscences – without any
disclaimer and often without other supporting evidence – no fewer than thirty-nine times
in its body.62
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It is at this point it is important to acknowledge the standard defense MacArthur’s
partisans deploy against accusations that MacArthur was lying. This is to suggest that
there is every chance that this is how MacArthur, who was in his eighties and near death
at the time of its publishing, remembered events. It is certainly possible that by the end of
his life he had come to fully internalize his own version of events as factual.
Reminiscences is just that, as is disclaimed early and with eyebrow raising regularity
within the text itself, but in this way too does the book distinguish itself from the
memoirs of other military men. While many men use such a platform to argue for or
against their involvement in certain events or decisions, MacArthur treats all of the
myriad decisions of war as background scenery as he weaves his story of “Douglas
MacArthur! Gentleman Adventurer!”
This perhaps explains the proximity to the front-line MacArthur implies
throughout. Implies, of course, because to actually claim regular proximity to fighting of
any scale – at least during the Second World War – would invite easy contradiction. This
apparent proximity allows MacArthur-the-storyteller to serve as a conduit for the
thoughts and actions of the fighting men, particularly the enlisted men. The soldiers at the
front occupy a place in the narrative history of modern war far disproportionate to their
numbers. There is a certain connection felt to the men – and women – who find
themselves unfortunate enough to have to redraw battle lines at the point of a bayonet.
This inescapable connection gives the candor of an infantryman in a foxhole a gravity
that may elude the general overseeing his theatre. If the soldier is cheerful, his rough-butwry wit brings a smile to the faces of the men and women back home reading his story. If
he is vengeful, the home front might be seized with a righteous indignation at his, no,
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their enemies. If he feels that he has been badly led and left to die by a particular person
or group, well, it might cause some shockwaves indeed.
It is doubtful that MacArthur spoke at any length to soldiers experiencing
significant combat at any point in the war, but he freely spoke for them. 63 He tells of how
they fight heroically, though louse ridden and hungry. He tells of how they laugh at
Japanese propaganda and spit at the idea of surrender. He tells of how they sing songs in
the trenches, as though he himself took up the chorus as he stood sentry through the
night. He tells of how they damn the men and groups who had misled them and damned
them to their own tropical hell. He never once, however, makes note of the peculiar
manner in which the enemies so derided by these men he seems to know so well seem to
match up exactly with a list of MacArthur’s own personal and political rivals. So too does
MacArthur fail to note the almost incredible omission from blame by these brave men of
the man whose ego, miscalculations, and strategic and tactical failures led more directly
to their deaths than any other.64 His readers, for a very long time, would miss this as well.
Problems, Hurdles, and Avenues of Attack
Histories that involve MacArthur, even those by historians critical of him, have
difficulty escaping the ubiquitous enormity of his character. An accounting of the, say,
Second Battle of El Alamein might mention a successful rebuff of a German spoiling
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attack by the 74th Field Artillery of the 50th Infantry Division. An accounting of a similar
event occurring under MacArthur’s command would, more often than not, refer to a
successful defense by “MacArthur’s Men.” Rather than the 13th Infantry launching an
attack along the right flank of a battle line “MacArthur’s right flank” would be
responsible. Such personification finds few other homes in the historiography of the
Pacific War, and none with such volume or regularity. The ubiquity of MacArthur’s
name in discussing the Pacific theatre stands out even among his contemporaries, and is
utilized in a personal-possessive sense with a frequency that at points approaches the
bizarre. 65 While it is not unheard of nor particularly uncommon for military forces to
find themselves anthropomorphized around a particularly charismatic leader –
discussions of “Patton’s Fifth Army” or “Rommel’s Afrika Korps” permeate discussion
of the same World War – none find themselves so completely inseparable from their
supreme commander.
This is unlikely to be accidental. Of the 142 communiques released by his press
office between December 1941 and March 1942, 109 mentioned only one individual,
MacArthur. 66 This of course omitted the names of soldiers, officers, and units that had
performed exceptional exploits, but it left the press, the public, and even some elements
within the War Department with the idea that MacArthur personally – and alone – was
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achieving the victories being reported on. For their part, the War Department and White
House both seized on the heroic image MacArthur was crafting for himself and used it
unsparingly to prop up the morale of a population greeted thus far by a mostly
unstaunched tide of Axis victory. 67 Even at the time, it was understood by the leadership
in Washington that they were purchasing domestic morale for the cost of making
untouchable a man they knew would probably be somewhat – but not critically –
detrimental to the war effort. Marshall would bluntly admit as much after the war,
describing MacArthur as a “fine commander,” but not without numerous qualifications
about his “supersensitivity” and belief that “… everybody had ulterior motives about
everything.” Marshall would also lament that MacArthur focused a significant amount of
his time picking fights with the Navy, despite Admiral Halsey (the naval commander
with whom MacArthur was most often directly involved) taking every pain to cater to
MacArthur. 68 Eisenhower, a man well acquainted with MacArthur, tactfully recorded of
his former superior’s failings during the opening salvos of the war his belief that
MacArthur, “might have done better at the beaches and passes, and certainly should have
saved his planes on December 8… but, he’s still the hero.”69 America needed a hero. In
MacArthur they had a man who felt it his destiny to give them one.
Historians have, therefore, to tangle with primary documents that use
MacArthur’s name extensively and often at the expense of names that would provide
more detail. A historian might easily find himself referring to “MacArthur’s left flank” or
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“MacArthur’s pursuit squadrons” because the exact names aren’t used in the primary
reports that they are using as a base for their arguments. They might just as easily be
using it because it is habitually consistent to adopt the same language as their source
material. Perhaps, even, a historian might relish the opportunity to have a larger-than-life
caricature to give the reader some relief from the tedium of unit numbers and ever
rotating junior officers. Regardless of the reasoning, it is apparently inescapable as even
MacArthur’s critics struggle to avoid falling into the trap of his ubiquity. Spector
specifically calls attention to this fixture of MacArthur’s reporting, yet himself regularly
refers to “MacArthur’s Forces” or some derivation thereof when more specific
designations might instead suffice.70 The caricature nature of MacArthur, so readily
lambasted by his critics, serves in this sense to further the perceived ownership of the
triumphs of his subordinates and the temptation offered by its convenience is often too
much work to avoid. Besides, with his pipe and his sunglasses and his unorthodox
uniform, MacArthur makes a really good caricature.
Objectives
As discussed previously, the goal of this work is not to establish guilt, but instead
to establish a pattern of behavior – and opportunity to consciously continue said pattern –
in order to establish a clear understanding of deliberate intent. That accounts of events
that could comfortably be described as “pro” or “anti” MacArthur exist is an established
fact. Likewise, that accountings of events that could be described as significantly
divorced from the events themselves were produced – both contemporaneously and
afterwards – by MacArthur and his defenders is not to be debated here. This work exists

70

Spector, 118.

46
to demonstrate that a sufficient quantity of evidence exists to prove – beyond a
reasonable doubt – that MacArthur’s motivations for fomenting this narrative were
cynical and selfish and that his position and the ready access he had to accurate
accountings of events preclude other reasonable explanations. Historians, both
sympathetic and critical of MacArthur, have long couched the distant relationship
MacArthur enjoyed with the truth in the language of eccentricity or else focused their ire
on his immediate subordinates. This supposed aloofness from a man with a well-deserved
a reputation for cunning and drive stretches the bounds of plausibility past any reasonable
extent.
A historical detective, building a case against MacArthur, would find no
admission of his intent to defraud America for his own selfish ends. There exists no
damning memorandum from Douglas MacArthur in which he orders the blatant
falsification of reports – at least none that have yet been unearthed. Neither does there
exist much discourse from his sycophants that more than implies an intention to
repackage events in a more favorable manner. It is therefore left to us to engage in a
broader survey of both the historiography at large and contemporary reporting. This case
must be made out of a collection of smaller evidential elements that in isolation are
perhaps excusable through ignorance or aloofness, but together demonstrate a pattern that
clearly indicates malicious intent. Through this wider lens we might discern a pattern of
bias, omission, and misrepresentation that through its consistency serves for us the same
purpose as the collected evidence of the crime scene investigator. Guilt, in this case, rests
not on a single smoking gun, but on an established pattern of behavior and action.

47

A CASE IN TWO PARTS
This section will examine in detail two points from the early days of American
involvement in the Second World War in the South Pacific. These points, in order, are the
effective destruction of Allied air power in the Philippines as a fighting force at Clark
Field, and the escape of MacArthur and his entourage from Corregidor Island. Both are
points of significant embarrassment for Douglas MacArthur and are selected here
specifically and exclusively for that quality. This is not, it is important to reiterate, an
attack on MacArthur for his failings nor is the intention to suggest that other commanders
would not have produced similar missteps. Rather, these are understandably the points
that those with a vested interest in the image of Douglas MacArthur would most wish to
blur and therefore the points at which their actions become the most obvious. Each case
will be examined according to the following pattern: a brief survey of events followed by
examination of primary documentation by MacArthur and his agents, juxtaposed where
necessary with contradictory primary evidence; this will in turn be followed by an
analysis of the ubiquity of the inaccurate narrative within the historiography and
subsequent analysis.
MacArthur’s own Pearl Harbor
On December 8, at 1235 local time, the Japanese 11th Air Fleet began an hourlong attack on Clark Field and neighboring Iba Field on the Philippine Island of Luzon.
The American Far East Air Force (FEAF) was caught completely flat footed –
unprepared in equal measure for the occurrence of the attack and the effectiveness of
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their Japanese foes. American anti-aircraft guns were unable to reach the Japanese
bombers cruising at 20,000 feet. What American pursuit craft were airborne or managed
to become so, mostly the top-of-the-line P-40 Warhawk, could not reach the cruising
height of the Japanese bombers and traded poorly with the accompanying Japanese
Mitsubishi A6M “Zero” fighters. By the time the smoke cleared, a third of the FEAF’s
prized bombing fleet was destroyed along with nearly one hundred other airplanes –
nearly half of which were P-40s. Two-hundred and thirty men were killed or wounded
and the FEAF’s key airfield and only RADAR facility in Luzon was badly damaged. The
destruction had been so complete that Zeroes from the attack on Iba Field reportedly flew
to Clark Field after running out of targets on which to spend their ammunition. The FEAF
claimed, somewhat dubiously, seven Japanese aircraft shot down. 71
It was and remains one of the most one-sided defeats in the history of the United
States military, made all the more catastrophic for the fact that MacArthur and his staff
had more than nine hours’ warning and the Japanese attack had itself been delayed by
weather. The severe losses prompted the evacuation from the Philippines of most of the
remaining FEAF assets, including all of the surviving B-17 bombers – for all intents and
purposes the only remaining offensive weapon in his arsenal – which in turn effectively
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ceded total air superiority to the Japanese. With his air force crippled, MacArthur was left
without the tools necessary to undertake his already dubious plan to defend the
archipelago from the beaches and without any means to prevent the Japanese from freely
bypassing the region.
How MacArthur Reported It
Whether MacArthur froze on the day or personally underestimated the capabilities
and aggressive initiative of the Japanese is speculative and ultimately irrelevant to this
study. Certain accounts report that he harbored hopes of Philippine neutrality, while
others report him as having been rendered catatonic by events. Neither is particularly
likely, but certainly little action was taken. MacArthur did, however, manage two press
releases subsequent to his acknowledgement of the War Department memo notifying him
of the state of war. The first, likely only approved rather than drafted by MacArthur, was
a simple acknowledgement of the state of war and a soon to age terribly declaration of
readiness. The second was much more steeped in the elegant prose for which the
American public would soon revere him as he declared that “the military is on alert and
every possible defense measure is being undertaken” before signing off his message with
a declaration of “serenity and confidence.”72
The initial messages on the day of the attack are emblematic of a command in
disarray. Though multiple messages were sent from Headquarters USAFFE to both the
War Department and to various USAFFE elements, they weren’t followed by orders in
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any meaningful sense. 73 By late morning, after the Far East Air Force’s (FEAF) radar
station picked up the incoming Japanese attack, a small number of P-40s were scrambled
but their launch was without direction and unfortunately timed to see them caught in the
process of landing by the Zeroes escorting the Japanese raid. 74
A press release from MacArthur’s office on the evening of December 8
mentioned – in passing – the Clark Field attack. It was given one sentence, sandwiched
between other items, and read in full: “Clark Field received a series of attacks today; the
heaviest occurred at 1:50 with sanguinary results to both sides.” 75 Reports to the War
Department, in a fashion that would become a hallmark of negative news in MacArthur’s
camp, were vague and brief. The longest radiogram regarding the attack sent on the day
from Headquarters USAFFE to the War Department to be signed by MacArthur stated
that the Japanese had heavily bombarded Clark and Nichols field while again
emphasizing sanguinary results on both sides. 76
A USAFFE internal memo, which would have been available to MacArthur at the
time, mentioned the losses in aircraft to be extensive and the number of casualties to be in
excess of two hundred while claiming just seven Japanese aircraft. A December 9 press
release commented only that “the material losses in planes on both sides were very
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heavy.” 77 MacArthur’s December 9 report to the war department claimed just twentyfour deaths at Clark and a further twenty-two at Iba, barely half of the true total. 78
MacArthur knew – though the War Department would not for some time – that the
“sanguinary” trade was cataclysmic for the Americans and merely a paper cut for the
Japanese.
MacArthur also, perhaps in an attempt to partially excuse his defeat, demonstrated
his underestimation of Japanese air capabilities when he reported on December 9 that he
had evidence “that his [The Japanese] dive bombers are at least partially manned by
white pilots.”79 This was, of course, not the case. On December 14 a press release
boasted that the “heavy punishment” he had inflicted upon the Japanese air fleet had
caused a “perceptible deterioration” in the effectiveness of Japanese bombings. This
conclusion does not seem to have a basis in anything, aside from what might plausibly be
an incredibly generous interpretation of the fact that the Formosa-based air forces of
Japan had effectively destroyed all of their initial targets in the Philippines, but it does
display a tendency by MacArthur to paint the course of a military operation not as a
series of cascading consequences but as a heroic and gritty series of reversals inflicted on
the enemy by him personally.80
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Reports of the readiness of MacArthur’s command varied as well. The
preparedness of his command had been massively exaggerated in the days and weeks
leading up to war. As late as December 5 MacArthur reported to the War Department that
the air forces under his command were alert and prepared to function in an effective
capacity. 81 This tack changed quickly once the Japanese had put lie to his grandiose
claims as he pivoted instead to claims of having been surprised and overwhelmed. He
would, from that point on, discuss the air corps under his command as a force that was
outnumbered and underequipped. 82 In a December 10 message ostensibly to Air Chief
General Arnold, but conspicuously sent to the War Department “For General Arnold”
rather than privately, MacArthur assured his colleague that every precaution “within their
[FEAF’s] limited means … had been taken here” and the losses were “due entirely to
overwhelming superiority of [the] enemy force.” He insisted that the Japanese had
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“hopelessly outnumbered” the Americans and that “no item of loss can be attributed to
neglect or lack of care.83
These statements contrast sharply with reports MacArthur’s office produced in the
coming months. As the situation in the Philippines worsened, MacArthur and his senior
staff became increasingly demagogic and embittered. 84 By late January his office was
reporting that aircraft under his command had “driven back Japanese bombers on-route to
the Philippines” over the Luzon Strait every day for nearly a week before - and even
concurrently with - the Pearl Harbor attack. 85 A press release, dated January 23, stated:
“General MacArthur’s troops anticipated the attack beginning December fourth and his
pursuit intercepting planes located hostile Japanese bombers from twenty to fifty miles
out at sea each night. The enemy planes always turned back before actual contact was
obtained. It is of historic interest that the last one of these night efforts was intercepted
and turned back at the exact hour of the delivery of the attack on Hawaii.” The sudden
“discovery” of the pre-war confrontations between “MacArthur’s Troops” and the
Japanese are, notably, completely absent from the internal reporting of MacArthur’s G-2
section. 86 While the almost two-month delay in sharing this information should seem
immediately suspicious, the claim is repeated in many histories.
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In casting around for a cause of the debacle not resident in MacArthur’s GHQ, the
actions of “Japanese spies” were quickly identified as the key agents behind the success
of the December 8 raids. By January, and without significant corroboration by
MacArthur’s G-2 or G-3 elements, MacArthur’s press releases included fanciful
declarations regarding “proof” acquired by the GHQ of treacherous fifth columnists. Not
letting minor details like “being entirely besieged in Corregidor” and “not having the
structures in place to obtain accurate information from beyond the battle lines on Bataan”
get in the way of a good story, MacArthur’s press releases spoke of Japanese residents in
the Philippines being organized into military units “nine-thousand strong.” A January 23
press release stated:
[The] Story of Japanese treachery subterfuge and use of fifth columnists prior to war
becomes more complete daily. Dozens of Japanese Army officers previously domiciled in
the Philippines as civilians returned to Japan just prior to hostilities carrying complete
reports on all landing fields and all landing beaches. Captured maps and documents
indicate information very comprehensive. When their attack was launched their bombers
were guided in on radio beams of stations of sympathizers located near our military
objectives. 87

The Japanese did, like any military, engage in an amount of intelligence gathering and
subterfuge. MacArthur’s own command had a picture of Japanese troop locations and
airfields at least as complete as their picture of his. The evidence to support a vast
network of malicious Japanese agents acting in coordination with the Japanese raiders

USAFFE: Press Releases, Philippines December 8, 1941-March 11, 1942, 1-23-1942, RG-2 Reel-19,
Box 12, Folder 4, Records of United States Forces in the Far East 1941-1942, MacArthur Memorial
Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, United States. Release dated January 23, 1942.

87

55
has, in years since, failed to materialize. 88 As with most of the reversals suffered by
MacArthur, a ready scapegoat – often a person or group who was unlikely to be in a
position to promulgate a contradictory account – was found onto whom the General could
place the blame for his failure. Shadowy and nebulous “Japanese Agents,” among much
else, are difficult for the press to reach out to for commentary.
On the Other Hand
A radiogram sent to MacArthur by Adjutant General Emory Adams at the War
Department hours before the attack detailed the attacks at Pearl Harbor, Wake, and Guam
as well as passing along reports of British air assets struggling to repel Japanese air raids
over Singapore and Malaya. The tactics of the Japanese attackers as well as their success
in destroying aircraft on the ground were both specifically mentioned in the message. 89
Additionally, a personal message had been sent to MacArthur from Arnold stating
specifically that reports from Hawaii indicated aircraft being destroyed on the ground
along with a series of recommendations to minimize such losses. 90 America was at war,
and MacArthur had everything he needed to know not only that the Philippines would be
attacked, but how they would be attacked. Further, he received explicit orders ordering
him to carry out tasks assigned to his command under the existing war plans – including
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launching air strikes against Japanese positions. On the morning of the seventh Marshall
sent a message to MacArthur stating, “Hostilities between Japan and the United States,
British Commonwealth and Dutch have commenced. Japanese made an air raid on Pearl
Harbor this morning, December 7. Carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they
pertain to Japan. In addition, cooperate with the British and Dutch to the utmost without
jeopardizing the primary mission of defense of the Philippines. You are authorized to
dispatch air units to operate temporarily from suitable bases in co-operation with the
British or Dutch.” 91 Further messages from Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General
Henry “Hap” Arnold, received on December 7 and 8 respectively, noted that in Hawaii,
Guam, Singapore, and elsewhere, allied aircraft were reported destroyed on the ground
by bombs and machine gun fire.92 Not only did MacArthur and his staff have
forewarning of an attack, but they also had clues about both the targets and the tools with
which they would be attacked. 93
Upon reflection, it is the January 23, 1942, release that is of particular interest.
Though it is more or less impossible to describe the claims within as categorically false,
as the complexities of actively losing a war place certain handicaps on the maintenance of
unit records, it should suffice to say that no contemporary vindication of the claims has
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yet been made available to researchers. 94 It is, in fact, a statement with only the most
passing resemblance to reality. A historian with only the barest understanding of the war
would cast doubt on the claims that MacArthur’s staff had obtained detailed evidence of
Japanese subterfuge while bottled up on Corregidor Island. While there had been a cable
on December 5 from the office of George Moore, commander of the harbor defenses
around Manila Bay, that claimed to have positive identification of enemy aircraft over
central Luzon, the report’s accuracy is questionable and at any rate no action seems to
have come of it. 95 The claim that “his” pursuit planes had repeatedly turned back
Japanese bombers should immediately draw the eyes of even the most passive student to
the complete and apparently antithetic surprise claimed by MacArthur’s command when
attacked on December 8. Finally, the claim that FEAF pursuit craft had turned back
Japanese bombers concurrent with the Pearl Harbor attack is not only easily debunked by
Japanese accounts, but also emblematic of a lack of knowledge of the true scope of
Japanese air superiority. 96
Later Defense
MacArthur would repeat the idea that his air forces were antiquated and paltry –
and those of the Japanese numerically overwhelming – for the rest of his life. In his own
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words, “Our air forces in the Philippines, containing many antiquated models, were
hardly more than a token force with insufficient equipment, incompleted fields and
inadequate maintenance. They were hopelessly outnumbered and never had a chance of
winning. They were completely overwhelmed by the enemy’s superior forces. They did
everything possible within their limited resources. I attach no blame to General Brereton
or other members of the command for the incidents of the battle. Nothing could have
saved the day for them.”97 Once again, MacArthur’s use of language is both subtle and
brilliant and his questionable relationship with facts not evidence of aloofness but of
calculation. The use of pronouns is subtle in its flow, but powerful in implication.
MacArthur begins by discussing “our” air forces, implying that the loss was one that was
shared by America as a whole. He quickly pivots to describing their defeat. They were
defeated because they had been put in a situation where they were opposite
“overwhelming” forces with “limited resources.” The implied neglect that had forced this
situation was not his, of course, they were after all “our” air forces. A third party must be
to blame, and it is in the assignment of this blame that MacArthur makes his only
appearance in the passage as an individual agent. He makes it clear in saying that he
attaches no blame to Brereton, which gives the reader little impression that Brereton
deserves no blame but very strongly implies that MacArthur is above any blame himself.
He is, after all, assigning – or not assigning – blame from an arbiter’s vantage.
The accounting of Paul Rogers, MacArthur’s one-time clerk turned academic, of
the Clark Field debacle is, unsurprisingly, very sympathetic to MacArthur. His own diary
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recorded little of interest on the day, dedicating only as much time to the Japanese attacks
on American holdings as he did to his own indignation at being called to work at
unpleasant hour of 5:30. 98 His account of the day is difficult as well. He makes the
bizarre and categorically false claim that part of the reason for the success of the attack
was a lack of American radar, saying, “there was none in those days.” This news would
no doubt have come as a surprise to the personnel manning the radar station at Iba Field.
He also inaccurately recalls the dating of the warning from the War Department about
keeping their planes from being destroyed on the ground as having been received on the
ninth, when it was in fact received on the morning of the eighth. The remainder of his
account of the attack names only one person, Brereton, at the feet of whom he lays all
blame for the losses, though with a conciliatory remark that they were “simply a gaggle
of planes and crews… not yet coordinated… and awkward in action” and that “we would
have lost them all later.”99 Interestingly, neither the January 23 press release claiming
pre- war aerial face-offs with the Japanese nor the events they purportedly relayed are
mentioned at any point.
Who Believed It?
The official accounting rendered by E. Kathleen Williams and Louis Fellow for
the United States Air Force, though sympathetic to Brereton’s inability to relocate all of
his B-17s to Del Monte, itself leans very heavily on MacArthur’s own accounts.
Completed just three years after the end of the war, the work repeats MacArthur’s claims
of pre-war sparring with Japanese attack craft while offering little more than the
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General’s own reports.100 It is in such deference that the work inadvertently reveals two
key insights, each a product of the relative closeness of the publication to the events
being discussed. In the section discussing Clark Field, historian Richard Watson notes
that very few official records of the FEAF survived the early part of the war, and the files
of the SWPA GHQ are themselves incomplete. He further notes that as early as 1944,
elements within MacArthur’s headquarters denied the existence of any such material.
This, he concedes, necessitates a reliance on interviews with personnel to establish the
course of events. He further concedes the contradictory nature of many of these
interviews. 101 In itself, this fact is an inconvenience, but the relationship between these
points must be put in context. The historical interest in documents related to Clark Field
was known to MacArthur’s headquarters by May 27, 1944, at the very latest. Coupled
with the fact that in 1948 the influence of MacArthur and his partisans was at something
of a zenith, a reliance of historians on personal recollections would undoubtedly favor
MacArthur’s version of events.102 A round of contradictory finger pointing, unsupported
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by large quantities of historical record and with the bulk of what remained being
produced under the guidance of MacArthur would leave a great deal of room to exonerate
a man already widely viewed as a national hero.
The official US Army history of the events at Clark Field (and concerning
MacArthur’s later evacuation) is Louis Morton’s The Fall of the Philippines. Published
initially in 1953, Morton delivers a remarkably nuanced analysis of the decision making
leading up to the attack. Operating with a mixture of contemporary documentation and
latter-day interviews, he eschews the assignment of blame to any particular individual but
paints a picture of a milieu of finger pointing and back biting – particularly between
Sutherland and Brereton – both at the time and in the years since. 103 This, perhaps
diplomatically, serves to largely elevate MacArthur above criticism. At the time of
writing MacArthur was – even after his dismissal – still a very significant figure both
within the Army and without and a direct attack on him in the Army’s own official
history was unlikely to be welcomed.
As it was absolutely the most historically significant secondary study of the topic,
the sources used by Morton in Fall of the Philippines would help shape future histories in
a more significant fashion than those omitted. His disproportionate reliance on interviews
and memoirs is notable in as much as it paints a picture of events through a handful of
conflicting, defensive, and confused accounts. The sequence of events is often the
sequence as recalled by a party with a vested interest in how blame was assigned. While
occasionally such biases clearly denoted, they are often unaddressed, which has the added
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effect of leading the notation of certain biases to strengthen the perceived impartiality of
those not clearly labeled. For example, when Morton recounts that MacArthur had
ordered Brereton to move the B-17 bombers stationed at Clark to Mindanao, it may
escape the reader that the sources utilized by Morton are a post-war interview with
Sutherland and a 1946 press release by MacArthur – each responding in part to the
recently published memoirs of Brereton.104
Morton’s account was a diligent accounting of events but engaged in no
speculation or detailed analysis as to the controversial subject of blame, except to
acknowledge that there was controversy to be had. In the example explored in the
previous paragraph, for instance, Morton’s matter-of-fact phrasing lends itself to
MacArthur’s narrative. MacArthur had indeed ordered that the B-17s at Clark Field be
moved to Mindanao, but Morton’s accounting gives the impression of an acute and
emergent order on which Brereton failed to act. It is far more likely – given the strategic
realities of the moment, MacArthur’s command style, Brereton’s later statements, and the
amiable relationship between the two men – that the order was for a movement to be
undertaken when necessary precursory actions, such as arranging a place to put the planes
in Mindanao, rendered such a transfer practicable. 105 Each man would have been fully
aware, when the order was given, that the movement was to be undertaken gradually and
when resources permitted. After disaster struck, the order became a convenient piece of
evidence of MacArthur acting and Brereton failing him – one he leaned in to. 106
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This neutrality does Morton, and many other historians, a disservice. He eschews
including many of MacArthur’s more fantastical claims, an understandable enough
decision as – especially in the early war – his claims divorced significantly from reality,
but in such a manner as to have little apparent effect on the events about which Morton
wrote.107 Unfortunately, in doing so Morton inadvertently allows them to help shape the
way the history would be recorded. In not discussing these claims, he cannot discredit
them. When combined with his willingness to use the accounts of MacArthur and his
partisans where he feels they provide a reliable accounting of events, giving their
accounts his tacit endorsement in doing so, this habit lends an air of validity to all claims
made by MacArthur’s camp.
Historians have long been able, therefore, to see in his work whichever argument
they wish. Take for example Gavin Long, a historian of similar quality and position to
Morton, who cites only two works in his telling of the events at Clark Field. The second
of these works is MacArthur’s Reminiscences, which Long seemingly cites only to
establish that MacArthur was not a particularly reliable witness by 1964, but the first is
Morton. 108 This reliance on Morton’s work is both commonplace and understandable but
tends to lead historians to arrive at the same indifferent conclusion. John C. McManus, in
his book Fire and Fortitude cites Morton as he couches his criticism of MacArthur in
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terms of “allow[ing] Sutherland to wall him off from the outside world… [creating] a
disastrous communication gap with MacArthur.”109
His defenders dutifully reveled in the interpretive space. The war-correspondent
turned radio-announcer Frazier Hunt, who travelled as a part of MacArthur’s Press Corps
during much of the Second World War, paints an altogether more favorable picture of
events in his 1954 work The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur. Without the
unwelcome interference of cited works, Hunt places all of the blame for the disaster on
“local commanders,” the pilots themselves, and a series of “confusing and conflicting
reports … by General Brereton and certain members of his staff,” though he notes
MacArthur’s magnanimity in his not specifically blaming anyone. Hunt does, helpfully,
include two separate accounts by MacArthur himself in his defense of the general’s
actions. In the first, penned in June 1943, MacArthur engages in a heated defense of
Brereton (and himself) by insisting that he had cleverly and deliberately moved half of
the heavy bombers under his command out of range of the enemy before the attack and
insists that the pursuit planes under his command were “vastly outnumbered” by the
Japanese and would have been lost in a matter of days anyway. 110 The second is a
response to a question by historian Louis Morton (misspelled as ‘Lewis’ in the text) about
whether MacArthur believed he could act to preempt Japanese attack on December 8. In
the lengthy response, MacArthur both denies that he had the authorization to take any
aggressive action against the Japanese and insists that had he, he would not have, as his
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command lacked fighter aircraft capable of escorting the bombers to their targets. The
former point is a misinterpretation (and a significant stretching) of pre-war standing
orders not to take unilateral war-starting action. 111 The later, it is also worth noting, is an
attempt to vindicate his inaction by applying tactical knowledge not gained until much
later in the war to the situation.112
Reports of General MacArthur, compiled by MacArthur’s staff, omits the debacle
at Clark Field entirely. Rather, it cites the very improbable press release from GHQ
USAFFE January 23, 1942, that claimed “his” pursuit planes had turned back Japanese
bombers on the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and concurrently with the Pearl Harbor
attacks, as evidence that MacArthur had anticipated the Japanese attack by several days.
The Japanese are mentioned as having attacked with “overwhelming air strength,” a
favorite claim of MacArthur in his later years, while the ample American air presence
was written off as “relatively weak.” The successes of the expert Japanese aviators are
described as being simply due to “an extensive espionage net… [that] enabled the
Japanese to concentrate their attacks accurately on the most important objectives,” a
claim not even substantiated in the series’ other volume. 113
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Later works are often victims of the tepid – all too often sycophantic – tone of
earlier historical works. Clayton James, whose Years of MacArthur has been utilized as a
source text nearly as often a Morton’s, echoes the latter’s conclusion that the task of
assigning blame has been readily taken up by all parties involved, but spends a significant
amount of time steadfastly refusing to pick sides. MacArthur, James writes, is subject to
blame in as much as he was responsible in a sense for all mistakes in his command as
commander in chief, but strongly implies that the fault lay mostly in the conflict of
personalities between Sutherland and Brereton. He also arrives, somewhat bizarrely, at
the conclusion that had Brereton been allowed to meet with MacArthur when first he
requested, the men would have decided to send the bombers to safety. A curious
conclusion given an audience with MacArthur a few hours later very much failed to come
to that conclusion.114
Historian Victor Davis Hanson’s work The Second World Wars: How the First
Global Conflict Was Fought and Won cites the 1967 work Corregidor: The Sage of a
Fortress by James and William Belote as he recounts, incorrectly, the number of
American planes destroyed in Luzon on the December 8. Of more significant note is the
manner in which he assigns ownership. Introducing the situation, the reader is told of the
“legendary” General MacArthur and “his” formidable air arm. On describing the
destruction of much of that air arm on the opening day of the war, they are suddenly
“Major General Lewis Brereton’s air forces” that were caught on the ground. Brereton, as
a character, is introduced and disposed of in the same sentence. 115
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Certain revisionists have attempted to steer their work away from MacArthur’s
accounts. Ronald H. Spector, in his 1985 work Eagle Against the Sun utilized very few
analyses from MacArthur’s headquarters in his analysis of the events of December 8 and
paints a profoundly negative picture of both the generalissimo and his command. He
describes MacArthur alternately as vainglorious, ambitious, and a “myth,” and the
strategies he insisted upon in the buildup to the war as “ill-conceived” in his kinder
moments and “totally impracticable” is his more scathing analysis. 116 Spector writes at
length about the events of December 8 and the roles played therein by the starring
characters of the USAFFE Command. Forming his analysis largely free of partisan
accounts, though admittedly using accounts by Wainwright and Brereton, Spector paints
a picture of a proactive Brereton desperately attempting to gain permission to take the
steps necessary to prepare the forces under his command for battle they were about to
face while being prevented from doing so by both MacArthur and Sutherland. Before
discussing MacArthur’s elevation to hero-status and subsequent receipt of the Medal of
Honor, Spector implies heavily that he could – perhaps even should – have been relieved
of command for his failures on and around December 8. 117 Spector, as with other critics
of MacArthur, limits his criticism to strategic concerns. Discussion of MacArthur’s
attempts at revision are, unfortunately, absent.
Upshot
For one military to surprise another despite, with the benefit of hindsight, there
being significant evidence of impending danger is a regular enough occurrence in
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military history. The very same military that was taken by surprise at Clark Field was
similarly upset mere hours before in Hawaii. Earlier that year the Nazi Reich had
launched what was then the largest offensive in European history into the Soviet Union to
the complete shock and disbelief of the Soviet leadership. The key factor distinguishing
these events from those at Clark Field is that in the aforementioned cases the defending
party was not – at least until that moment – at war with the aggressors. Those in
command during the Clark Field debacle, including and especially MacArthur, had
known they were at war all day. As historian of Military Intelligence Stephen Budiansky
flatly offers, if Pearl Harbor was caught “asleep,” MacArthur’s Forces were
“comatose.” 118 Brereton himself would later speculate that MacArthur’s unwillingness to
grant him an audience or approve action was born out of futile hopes of Philippine
neutrality. 119
Headquarters, USAFFE, shouldn’t have had forewarning of an attack. The raid by
the 11th Air Fleet was scheduled to coincide with the attacks at Pearl Harbor and
Singapore. Formosa, from whence the attack was to be launched, was blanketed by a
thick fog that prevented the Japanese aircraft from taking off for hours. Saburo Sakai, a
pilot of the air group that participated in the raid, recalled a prevailing belief among the
pilots on the ground that American aircraft from Luzon would be overhead to bomb them
before they could get underway and if they could get airborne, they would be met not by
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an unready enemy on the ground but by swarming aircraft in defensive positions.120
Neither proved to be the case. General Brereton, the head of the FAEF, insisted on just
such a bombing raid on Formosa as soon as news reached him about the new state of war.
MacArthur repeatedly rebuffed Brereton’s entreaties as did MacArthur’s chief of staff
General Sutherland. While Brereton did eventually win authorization to engage in a
limited reconnaissance of Formosa and begin defensive deployment of pursuit aircraft,
both orders came too late.121
The claims of MacArthur’s camp regarding both the failure to undertake proactive
bombing of Formosa and to have turned back Japanese attacks in the days leading up to
the war are rooted in a selective misunderstanding of contemporary doctrine. American
air doctrine of the time did not call for escort fighters to fly in defense of bombardment
craft; however, as was evidenced by events, Japanese doctrine did. Furthermore, the
eighty-five Japanese A6M “Zero” fighters that accompanied the December 8 attacks were
superior machines to the Curtis P-40 Warhawks that made up the cream of the FEAF
pursuit detachments and their pilots were at this point in the war likewise of a higher
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caliber than their American and Filipino opponents. 122 That this was not apparent to the
men of GHQ USAFFE is hardly an oversight on their part. The destruction of the FEAF
as a force capable of contesting control of the skies less than twelve hours into the war
never allowed the command an opportunity to determine the competitiveness of their
craft in even combat.123 Many of the aircraft and pilots still in the Philippines would
perform very admirably, leaving little reason for the Americans to suspect the disparity in
quality. Had there been an actual attempt to intercept the Japanese attack force,
particularly as close to their targets as the January 23 press release claimed, it is unlikely
that the attack would have been delayed – much less repulsed – and equally unlikely any
American pursuit craft would have survived the encounter. Similarly, while an
unescorted bombing raid by American B-17s on Formosan airfields almost certainly
would have been a catastrophic failure, none of the general officers of the USAFFE
would have had any reason to suspect as much at the time. MacArthur’s later insistence
that his decisions were based on a sympathetic understanding of the tactical vulnerability
therefore ring somewhat hollow.
In the immediate aftermath, MacArthur’s energies were mostly focused on
political damage control. To deeply analyze his December 10 message “to General
Arnold” is to recognize a masterpiece of defensive writing. His framing of the report as a
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private reply to Arnold sets the tone of the message. Arnold had indeed put voice to a
furious confusion as to why the FEAF had been so comprehensively destroyed, but his ire
was directed mostly at the local air commander General Brereton. MacArthur, a savvy
veteran of the politics of the War Department, would have little feared Arnold’s criticism
of his subordinate, but recognized both that those with opinions that could affect
MacArthur would not take long to cast their eyes up the chain of command and that
Arnold had given him an opportunity to outmaneuver them. MacArthur first presents
himself as defending the soldiers and pilots of the FEAF, rather than his immediate
subordinate. To attempt to defend a member of his headquarters would easily be
interpreted as MacArthur implicating himself by “circling the wagons” around his staff.
Instead presenting himself as an arbiter defending the lowest rungs of his command from
unjust criticism, he implies that he too is seeking answers for a failure of action that must
be somewhere in between him and them. Further, he is able to work in claims that every
precaution was taken and that neither neglect nor incompetence played a part in the
defeat. Again, he is ostensibly reporting on behalf of his troops, but carefully uses
language that presses the reader to exonerate him with them. Finally, he manages to work
in – as matters of fact – the ideas that the Japanese had overwhelming numbers and that
the forces allotted to him were woefully inadequate. 124
The January 23 GHQ release also, rather helpfully, announces its intention when
it includes the phrase “it is of historical note.” 125 It is unlikely that the soldiers under

Cable to AGWAR (War Department) from Headquarters U.S. Army Forces Far East, 12-10-41, RG-2
Reel-6, Box 2, Folder 6, Records of United States Forces in the Far East 1941-1942, MacArthur Memorial
Archives, Norfolk, Virginia, United States.
125
USAFFE, Press Releases, Philippines December 8, 1941-March 11, 1942. Release dated January 23,
1942.
124

72
MacArthur’s command, already growing disillusioned with their leader and his grandiose
proclamations and with some doubtlessly aware of the inaccuracy of the information
presented, believed much of the statement. However, a press release is by its very nature
not for the soldiers, but for the press. Newspapers would print stories of a heroic leader,
with a name that people would vaguely remember, doggedly fighting against an enemy
that only he had seen coming. Historians, beginning not long after the war and continuing
to the present day, cite the valuable primary document created by the GHQ as they repeat
its claims. It was a clear attempt to create primary information that painted MacArthur in
a more favorable light than would the facts alone and it was done, explicitly, for the
historical record. This statement, as most statements emanating from GHQ USAFFE
were, was signed: MacArthur.
One is also left with the distinct impression that both MacArthur’s words to
Arnold and his later reports of these pre-war stare-downs with the Japanese cannot
simultaneously be true. In fact, it is almost certain that neither is. A cable from the office
of George Moore, commander of the harbor defenses around Manila Bay, claimed on
December 5 to have positive identification of enemy aircraft over central Luzon, but no
action seems to have come of it.126 The story about repelling pre-war Japanese bombing
attempts is the product of a man keen to display himself as more cunning and alert than
everybody else and who had likely already forgotten his insistence that he had been
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caught entirely by surprise a few weeks prior. Likewise, the narrative about having a tiny
and antiquated air force stands up poorly to scrutiny as MacArthur actually had at his
disposal the largest American air force based outside America. 127
MacArthur, unlike Kimmel and Short in Hawaii who were the subject of several
lengthy investigations, escaped any inquiry into the fiasco at Clark-Iba. General Claire
Chennault, who spent eight years combatting the Japanese Air Forces in China would
later write, “The lightness with which this cardinal military sin [having one’s aircraft
caught on the ground] was excused by the American high command… has always
seemed to me one of the more shocking defects of the war.”128
Escape from Corregidor
On March 11, 1942, after sunset, four small PT boats crept out of Manila Bay.
They carried, besides their crews, General Douglas MacArthur, his wife and child, and
his child’s nanny. The remainder of the passengers consisted of officers and staff that,
aside from a few individuals included by orders from the War Department, would form
the nucleus of the new command he was to set up in the relative safety of Australia.
These men had been carefully selected by MacArthur and Sutherland for their skillsets,
effectiveness, and – most important of all – their personal loyalty to MacArthur. 129 The
party endured an uncomfortable, but uneventful, journey across the northeastern edge of
the Sulu Sea before disembarking on the northern coast of Mindanao. A few pleasant
days on a local plantation were followed by another uncomfortable, but similarly
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uneventful, journey – this time by air – to Australia. A further journey from their port of
arrival near Darwin to the train station at Alice Springs preceded one by rail to
Melbourne. It was during the latter, on March 20, before the first assembly of reporters
had faced since leaving the Philippines, that MacArthur was first able to deliver the line
that would be forever associated with the man: “I came through and I shall return.” 130
How MacArthur Reported It
“The President of the United States ordered me to break through the Japanese
lines and proceed from Corregidor to Australia for the purpose, as I understand it, of
organizing an American offensive against Japan, the primary purpose of which is the
relief of the Philippines. I came through and I shall return." 131 These are the words with
which MacArthur left the small collection of reporters in Terowie station before resuming
his train journey to Melbourne. This apparently impromptu statement, he would have
been aware, was one of the most important of his life. His reputation, his career, and his
legacy hung on those few words. The situation in the Philippines was bad, and rapidly
deteriorating, and the Allied servicemen there were suffering badly. The appearance of
their commander stepping out of a luxurious train car more than three thousand miles
away would leave little work for his critics should he fail to convince with his address.
As usual, he delivered masterfully.
Each word was carefully chosen, truthful enough to escape correction, and
drenched in implication. The President had “ordered” him out, which was true, but
implied strongly that he would not have left were he not commanded to do so. That he
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had been forced “to break through Japanese lines” was factual only if those lines were on
a map but elicits images of MacArthur hacking his way through Japanese infantry with a
steel helmet and a machete rather than of a desperately seasick old man being secretly
whisked away by boat in the dead of night. Further, explaining that he was there to
organize a counterattack left the world believing he would collect his troops and
immediately set sail for the Philippines at their head. To read MacArthur’s words
splashed across the front pages of newspapers would be to envision a man who would be
standing on the foredeck of a destroyer set for Luzon – strong jawed and steely eyed –
within the week, not a man who would spend the next several years living in a series of
luxury hotels in Eastern Australia. A less savvy man would have been torn to shreds by a
cutting press and a gob smacked public. MacArthur flourished.
The news media reveled in MacArthur’s daring escape. The front page of the Los
Angeles Times on March 22, 1942, carried a story relayed by Hugh Casey, one of the
men with whom MacArthur had left the Philippines, of “an amazing escape” in which the
party had dodged snipers, guerillas, and Japanese destroyers in their breakout. The Times
of London reported that the Australians welcomed Macarthur “for his renown as a
fighter.”132
On the Other Hand
MacArthur was never one to miss an opportunity to pat himself on the back nor
voice his discontent at perceived slights. His office issued a statement on March 10, the
day before his departure, to announce the decorations of several units by the War
Department. MacArthur made clear that units were being decorated for “enabling
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successful execution of the commanding general’s strategic plan” despite “inadequate
airfields… anti-aircraft protection… [and] limited equipment.” 133 If he was leaving – and
he was certainly leaving – MacArthur saw no need to leave in any doubt that his
command had been excellent, and he had been denied victory only by stingy planners in
Washington.
Discussions between MacArthur and Marshall regarding his evacuation had
begun as early as late January. By early February discussions to evacuate American
civilians and “key personnel” were in advanced stages. On February 4, it was suggested
to MacArthur that his wife and young son be evacuated, but MacArthur demurred stating,
“they and I will share the fate of the garrison.”134 Whether this was earnest bravado or a
calculated gamble that the MacArthur family as a package being lost would be a public
relation disaster the War Department would not be able to stomach is completely
speculative and comes down largely to one’s preexisting opinions of the man. In either
case, they were not separated.
There can be no doubt that, MacArthur, a man well studied on the great figures of
military history, was keenly aware of the terrible optics involved in the evacuation.
Strategically prudent or not, he would have well understood that a commander who
escaped battle alone usually left his reputation dead alongside his army. In a message to
Marshall on February 25, MacArthur pleaded with his superior that he be allowed to
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control both the timing of his evacuation and the manner in which it was presented. He
stressed that a withdrawal of his person without the proper presentation might cause a
complete collapse of Filipino forces in the region and that the reasoning for his
evacuation would not be explainable “to their simple intelligence.” 135
A measure of MacArthur’s embarrassment is perhaps best taken by the paradigm
shift in his messaging. The press releases from MacArthur’s GHQ had grown both in
length and verve as the siege had dragged on. As early as the end of January, they more
closely resembled – in tone, length, and content – tabloid editorials than the building
blocks of respectable broadsheets. MacArthur’s headquarters issued a press release on
March 10 passionately denouncing Japanese claims that Japanese nationals in the
Philippines had suffered undue harm at the hands of American military. 136 A press
release the preceding day was an equally impassioned, and slightly unhinged,
denunciation of the subjugation of the Philippines under Japanese rule. 137 The final press
release penned by MacArthur in his headquarters on Corregidor was made on March 11,
the day he and his party boarded the PT boats on which they would slip out of Manila
Bay contained just four words. This dramatic change in tone, from fiery demagogue to
terse stoicism, perhaps more than any other single passage indicates the shame he felt.
Unlike his bombastic declaration of nine days later, his March 11 press release would not
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be splashed across newspapers across America. It read, in its entirety, “The situation
remains unchanged.” 138
Further Defense
The characterization of the move as either being made against his will or being
significantly daring and dangerous is one he would push for the rest of his life. In his own
memoir, the escape from the island is painted as a daring sortie through cyclone-like
conditions under the very guns of the Japanese blockade. The flight from Mindanao to
Australia consumed by a hair-raising game of cat and mouse with Japanese fighters hot
on his tail. He insists too that he had been denied a request to return to the Philippines,
undertake a fanciful breakout operation, and personally lead a guerilla campaign against
the Japanese. 139 His kindest critics suggest that by the memoir’s completion, he might
have even believed it.140
As early as April 11, 1942, MacArthur was insisting that “My regret is that I was
not with it [the Bataan force] in its last hour of trial and agony.” He would report in an
interview with Frazier Hunt for his 1954 biography that “I fully expected to be killed. I
would never have surrendered. If necessary, I would have sought the end in some final
charge. I suppose the law of averages was against my lasting much longer in any
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circumstances. I would probably have been killed in a bombing raid or by artillery fire….
And Jean and the boy might have been destroyed in some final general debacle.” 141
Paul Rogers, unsurprisingly, paints a very sympathetic picture of MacArthur’s
escape. He notes that the evacuation was ordered by the War Department, which it was,
and that MacArthur requested limited flexibility on selecting the date, which he did.
However, his accounting of MacArthur’s unwillingness to leave is predicated almost
entirely upon interviews and statements made years afterwards in the 1950s and 1960s.142
That Rogers is biased is, of course, completely understandable. He owed his very survival
to his close proximity and loyalty to MacArthur and much of the success he enjoyed
thereafter sprung from the same font, but his readers are left without an admission of this
overwhelming bias.
Instead, Rogers takes great pains to present his work as unbiased historical
accounting. Unfortunately, he tends to cite only the most mundane and demonstrable
facts and otherwise, his defense of MacArthur’s escape is itself largely speculative and
hagiographic. This is especially telling in a passage where he addressed the accusation
that MacArthur “had led his troops into a death trap from which they could not escape,
and then had run away to personal safety and personal glory.”143 Constructing from
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whole cloth a conversation between MacArthur and Sutherland that he recalls occurring,
but one that Rogers himself was not party to he posits:
I suspect that MacArthur talked of the betrayal of the Philippines, gesticulating in despair,
complaining of Roosevelt’s refusal to move, as honor had dictated, to the relief of the
Filipinos. He must have grimaced with disgust and even revulsion as his words warmed
his passion. He must have asserted at least once: “Dick, I will resign my commission. I will
go to Bataan as a civilian and stand with the troops until the bitter end.” 144

Invented, by his own vague admission, such a passage would ordinarily be easy to
catalogue as either the musing of a man desperate to imagine his chosen father-figure as a
tough-as-nails warrior in the face of evidence to the contrary or, alternatively, as the
speculations of a devoted underling recalling the spirit of events in lieu of specific details.
The damning action, as far as the charge of deliberate manipulativeness is concerned, is
the way he cites the passage. The paragraph is cited just once with a single notation at the
end of the last sentence. This is in keeping with Rogers’s preferred format, but it does add
an air of authority to the speculations about MacArthur’s fiery desire to go die alongside
those trapped on Bataan. Unfortunately, the endnote connected to the passage gives only
the entirely superfluous comment that “MacArthur had resigned his commission in 1937
to serve as military adviser,” a statement with minimal relation to the passage and
relaying facts made apparent long before the twenty-third chapter of the book. 145 No, the
purpose of the note is simply to exist as such, and through doing so add a veneer of
validity to Rogers’s speculative claims.
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Who Believed Him?
The split surrounding MacArthur’s evacuation comes down largely to which
primary sources a historian has placed the most value upon. Those who most highly value
interviews with key participants fall heavily into the camp loosely bound by the idea that
MacArthur, heroically and against his wishes, undertook a daring and dramatic dash to
meet up with and lead a relief force while those who place greater value on primary
documentation created outside MacArthur’s GHQ are far more likely to view the episode
unfavorably.
Frazier Hunt, following interviews with MacArthur himself, writes of
MacArthur’s insistence on his desire to stay with the soldiers under his command and
share their fate only to be ordered to evacuate for the greater good of the war effort.
MacArthur himself voices similar sentiments in his autobiography. Charles Willoughby,
MacArthur’s then-intelligence chief turned biographer, paints the decision as one forced
upon a grudging MacArthur and the escape – of which Willoughby was as much a
participant as the Generalissimo – as a “breakout” undertaken “against the odds” that “the
remaining smoke-begrimed men covered with the murk of battle… of Bataan… [saw as]
a matter of grave doubt that the little escape party would succeed.” 146
Walter Borneman, who does not put as much weight on primary accounts from
within MacArthur’s inner circle, notes that the oft-told stories about MacArthur’s desire
to stay in the Philippines “makes a great story, particularly in light of later travesties
inflicted upon the troops left behind on Bataan, but it is more in keeping with the
MacArthur legend than fact. The record simply doesn’t support it.” It doesn’t. Sutherland,
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frequently the only man consulted by MacArthur and privy to very nearly every
conversation the Generalissimo had, did not recall any such posturing from MacArthur
and his departure.147 Borneman, however, does not press the investigation of the
MacArthur legend to its logical conclusion. Despite noting that the fantastical tale spun
by MacArthur’s camp could not be corroborated by other contemporary sources,
Borneman fails to delve into the motivations and actions which facilitated the legend’s
proliferation.
Though Rogers’s work would succeed that of Costello by more than a decade, his
sentiments had long been proliferated by MacArthur’s allies. Costello’s work offers much
recounting of MacArthur’s agonizing over the order to evacuate. He cites accounts of
MacArthur insisting that he would resign and enlist as a simple volunteer before
abandoning the men under his command and that only continued pleading from
Sutherland and the rest of his staff convinced him to undertake the evacuation. He cites
Clayton James’s 1975 work on MacArthur, but the work in question – without in any way
hinting in the text – cites only MacArthur’s own memoir as a source for the claim.
Sutherland, in his papers, recounts no such discussion. 148
Upshot
That MacArthur was embarrassed by his flight is apparent enough. His
acknowledgement of the evacuation order requested specifically he be able to select the
time and manner of his departure. He would in turn choose his timing so the soldiers on
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Bataan would not know about the evacuation until it was comfortably in the past tense
and his first words to reporters upon arriving in Australia would serve to paint his escape
as a near-run and daring sojourn made for the sole purpose of gathering a relief force. It is
not beyond the realm of possibility that this may have even been his earnest belief, but
the defensiveness with which he would for the rest of his life treat the evacuation hints at
a deep vein of personal shame. 149
In MacArthur’s February 25 message to Marshall, MacArthur had sought control
over both the timing of and messaging surrounding his evacuation. He had couched this
request in paternalistic language about how the “simple intelligence” of the Filipinos
would lead to their capitulation were they not properly prepared for his departure. 150 It is
much more likely that MacArthur recognized that it was during this period that the
narrative that he and his staff had created was most vulnerable. Marshall’s message of
two days earlier, to which MacArthur was replying, had pressed MacArthur to undertake
his evacuation at the earliest date possible but was operating on a not-altogether-accurate
understanding of the situation in Luzon. The situation, especially on Bataan, was much
worse than MacArthur had been reporting to the War Department. His shambolic and
confused attempts to orchestrate a defense of the whole of Luzon had resulted in crushing
defeat and the chaotic retreat to Bataan and Corregidor had led to the bulk of the supplies
that had been expected to supply them instead being captured by the Japanese. 151 The
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dismal supply and tactical situations coupled with the relative safety of MacArthur on
Corregidor had made him deeply unpopular among the rank and file on Bataan. Were he
to be whisked away before being allowed to lay groundwork and lay down very specific
messaging, the consequences not just for the defense of the Philippines but for
MacArthur would be catastrophic.
To understand the discussion surrounding MacArthur’s evacuation one must have
a degree of understanding of MacArthur’s reporting of the war to that point. The war that
the press reported MacArthur waging, and to a significant degree the war that MacArthur
reported to the War Department, often bore little more than a passing resemblance to the
war on the ground. The conspicuous valor of the American and Filipino forces in their
struggle against the Japanese was real enough, though rarely was it reported without
MacArthur’s being the only name attached, but from a strategic standpoint the campaign
had been an unmitigated failure. The Japanese had not been meaningfully delayed, they
had not taken disproportionate casualties, and their best units were not tied down.152 The
predicament of the besieged, in terms of disease, hunger, and morale, was desperate in a
fashion that MacArthur would never fully acknowledge. In crafting the narrative
surrounding his evacuation, he was in a very real sense working to defend the veracity of
a body of work months in the making.

maintain 10,000 men for six months which makes it difficult to rationalize MacArthur’s decision on
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This was not, however, known at the time to Marshall. MacArthur had been
sending glowing reports to the War Department. These dispatches spoke of crushing
victories against Japanese formations in daring battles, an elite and vastly numerically
superior force tied down by MacArthur’s stubborn resistance, and a tactical masterpiece
of a defense. His press releases boasted of the toll exacted upon the ubiquitous Japanese
aircraft by the dogged American defenders and the growing frustration of the Japanese
commanders. 153 In the middle of it all, of course, was MacArthur. 154
The language used by MacArthur in his reports was reminiscent of that of a
biblical king. The day after his message to Marshall insisting on creative control in
planning his evacuation, MacArthur reported to the War Department:
With light forces I swept through the enemy’s screen before my battle position and am now
in command of the terrain to my front. The enemy has definitely recoiled. He has refused
his flank in front of my right six to ten kilometers and in other sections by various distances.
I am pressing to locate and fix his position. His attitude is so passive as to discount any
immediate threat of attack…. In the mountain province.... our guerilla activities have
become so harassing and deadly that the enemy will shortly be forced either to evacuate or
rebuild his forces. Indications are the former. 155

MacArthur’s press releases carried a section, boastfully labeled the “scorecard,” that kept a running tally
of Japanese aircraft that had been shot down forces under his command. These abruptly and sheepishly
ceased in February, by which time they claimed to have dispatched about a tenth of the entire Japanese air
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In actual fact, events described by MacArthur bore few commonalities with events in
Bataan. The event most likely to be the inspiration for MacArthur’s February 27 report
was a February 22 move by the Japanese 14th Army that saw them withdraw their line to
the north – a few miles in places – to consolidate their line. As this consolidation was in
keeping with an explicit order from the Japanese commander, General Homma, to
reposition to besiege the peninsula, it was unlikely that a staff as experienced as
MacArthur’s could have mistaken it for the staggering victory claimed by MacArthur.
Marshall, however well aware of his subordinate’s flair for the dramatic, had no
reason to suspect his general to be inventing the successes on which he reported. While
Marshall would have little entertained the idea that MacArthur was leading the charge
from the front, the dispatches he received painted a picture of a man who was in close,
experiential contact with the situation on the ground. MacArthur’s dispatches never
mentioned a shortage of any supplies bar ammunition, never mentioned souring morale,
and absolutely never implicated himself as a cause for either. The situation that Marshall
was aware of was “reasonably favorable” in as much as it was one in which the forces on
Bataan and Corregidor were very much trapped, but meeting success at every turn and
badly frustrating elite elements of the Japanese military.156 Eisenhower, who had long
experience with MacArthur, repeatedly (privately) bemoaned MacArthur’s
dramatizations, egocentrism, and self-aggrandizement in the first months of the war,
though never committed to writing any impression that the broad situation in the
Philippines was significantly different than the one MacArthur described. Such a
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situation could easily tolerate the relocation of its senior commander to a position where
he might have a less congested strategic view. Such a situation did not exist. 157
In truth, MacArthur was facing crippling supply shortages – largely of his own
making – and hoarding what supplies existed on the island of Corregidor. 158 His starving
and disease-ridden soldiers, through a mixture of desperation and excellent on-the-ground
leadership in Bataan-proper, were just able to hold back a Japanese force that was largely
content to besiege the peninsula and await their eventual surrender. As for the Japanese
force MacArthur had reported being “elite” and “overwhelming,” unsurprisingly, neither
was the case. Homma’s invading force, which had comfortably defeated the AmericanFilipino forces in open battle, had been largely withdrawn for redeployment in the
Netherlands East Indies. It was instead a force intended to garrison the island with which
he besieged Bataan. Though under-fed and suffering badly from disease – both of which
directly related to MacArthur’s command decisions – the American and Filipino forces
nonetheless outnumbered these Japanese reservists more than two-to-one. 159
Critics of MacArthur have long taken the opportunity to lambast MacArthur.
Walter B. Hopkins quotes Eisenhower’s diary entry of March 19 suggesting that “the
public has built itself a hero out of its own imagination … strange that no one sees the
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dangers.” Ronald Spector goes a step further quoting the commander of the 11th Division
on Bataan, William Brougher, who wrote, “A foul trick of deception has been played on a
large group of Americans by a commander in chief and a small staff who are now eating
steak and eggs in Australia. God damn them!” 160 Such contemporary contempt for
MacArthur’s reporting might have been disastrous for the General’s reputation, but time
and circumstance was on his side. Few of his critics had the means or the interest to
challenge his narrative. Those in the War Department, like Eisenhower, had little interest
in airing their grievances publicly. Those in the field often had to liaise with MacArthur
or his staff to communicate with the press. General Brougher, and far too many like him,
would spend most of the war as unhappy guests of the Japanese Empire. They would
emerge from their captivity only to find themselves faced with the uncomfortable choice
of whether to criticize one of the most powerful and beloved men on Earth. These often
opted for silence, or else consigned their criticism to private writings which would not
see the light of day until after their deaths.

MacArthur and the Art of Further Control
Censorship
Censorship, as a practical concept, elicits multiple antipathetic perspectives. To
paint with the broadest possible brush, it is generally decried by individuals who place
value on or find economic security in the free passing of information. It is, inversely,
most beloved by those who wish to hide their plans, struggles, and failures. In wartime
more than any other period, arguments for censorship are bolstered by a very real
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strategic imperative to protect one’s position from enemy exploitation. Censorship is
therefore, as a practice, a powerful tool for the control of information, but one with great
latitude in regard to exactly what information is curated. This, in turn, leads to significant
influence on the part of the censors – and their benefactors – as to exactly which
information is deemed to necessitate concealing. Douglas MacArthur would oversee a lot
of censorship.
The satirist Steven Wright described experience as “something you don’t get until
just after you need it.” 161 Douglas MacArthur was well acquainted with this principle.
There were likely few military men in the entire world more aware of just how much
damage a hostile press could do than MacArthur when his train rolled into Melbourne on
March 21, 1942. A decade earlier, he had found himself the subject of the newspaper’s
ire for his perceived role in the violent expulsion of the so-called “Bonus Army” from
Washington. The scandal followed him for years – long after he would have preferred it
confined to the dustbin of history – and created a snowball effect that threatened further
scandals as reporters started to ask questions about his failed marriage and his teenaged
Filipina inamorata. 162 His secrets increasingly unsafe and a promising career in
conservative politics put indefinitely on hold, MacArthur’s decision to retire to a position
of power and prestige on the other side of the world while still nearly a decade from the
Army’s mandatory retirement age was, as much as it was anything else, an escape. 163 He
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would, however, learn from the experience and would in the future ensure that the press
was kept on a tight leash and that the only stories that could filter back to an
impressionable public were his own.
In the early days of the war, the control of the flow of information leaving the
Philippines concentrating in MacArthur’s headquarters was more de-facto than de-jure.
He and Quezon had a long-standing and broadly symbiotic relationship and there was
little opportunity otherwise for reports to filter back to America. The state of open
warfare for the archipelago, especially of the island of Luzon, was brief, confusing, and
chaotic. By the end of December, the Japanese controlled Manila, and Quezon and
MacArthur occupied what was for all intents and purposes the same headquarters on
Corregidor. 164 In any practical sense, as Censorship of the press was instituted shortly
after the outbreak of war and a Western press in any respect was confined to MacArthur’s
command area by the last week of December, there existed little opportunity for the War
Department or the American press to obtain information on the conflict that hadn’t been
released by MacArthur’s GHQ.165
The situation in Australia was altogether different. He arrived a man who was
viewed by many of the locals as a potential savior, but he was still a foreigner. He had no
claim to understand Australia or Australians and it would not take long for the relief the
locals felt towards his arrival to sour into a simmering resentment that their sons, soldiers,
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and generals lived and died by the command of a man who was himself an “other.” In
Australia, MacArthur was surrounded by more (and less constrained) institutions. In the
Philippines, MacArthur had found himself in control of the flow of information almost
immediately following the outset of hostilities as the rapidly shifting military situation
abolished alternative outlets. Australia would face no such invasion and housed more
press apparatuses in Australia than in the Philippines. American and British journalists
moved freely alongside local newsmen, and each was subject to different authorities. To
censor one group but not the others might lead quickly to conflicting stories. To
unilaterally impose censorship on all three would be incredibly unpopular and cast
aspersions on what stories were subsequently published.
It was well within the authority of MacArthur as the Commander in Chief of the
SWPA to impose censorship on all press discussing military matters. Technically there
was no specific legal or diplomatic basis for such a move, but a variety of factors
including the uncomfortable military situation and both the Australian and American
governments being sympathetic to the move would have seen such action, while balked at
in some corners, ultimately accepted. Instead, MacArthur opted to force the decision on
Roosevelt and Australian Prime Minister John Curtain. In April and May of 1942
MacArthur traded several messages with the War Department and with Curtain
bemoaning his lack of control over the press. 166 MacArthur was able to exercise a
complete control over the American press corps, but little over the Australians and none
over the British. This created, in theory, a potentially precarious position where
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journalists from the latter two nations could publish accounts contradictory to the
accounts approved by MacArthur’s headquarters. Eventually pressed by Marshall to
undertake a “complete revision” of the potentially embarrassing censorship situation,
MacArthur appealed to Marshall to raise the question with “an authority superior to his
own,” of course meaning Roosevelt. 167 Though some of his defenders interpret this as
MacArthur being “reluctant” to impose censorship on foreign presses, the passing on of
the responsibility for what would ultimately be a sensible and eventual order freed him
from being specifically charged with attempting to control the narrative presented to the
public. With diplomatic pressure from the White House, censorship authority over
Australian and British journalists was ceded to MacArthur, granting him a complete
monopoly on the flow of information to the public and all without ever having to get his
hands dirty.
MacArthur’s time in Army Public Relations had left him with the skillset
necessary to effectively take advantage of his complete control on information. From the
middle of May 1942, MacArthur was the sole source of information about MacArthur,
MacArthur’s operations, and anything with which MacArthur was remotely associated.
The journalists in the field who were ill-disposed to form part of the MacArthur machine
found it virtually impossible to continue reporting and commentating and an attitude of
revulsion began to characterize their all-too-often-unpublished writing.168 Australian war
correspondent Osmar White wrote bitterly; “An early sign of the sensitivity was a savage
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flood of censorship directives and the insistence of MacArthur’s general headquarters
that field censorship was not competent to decide all matters of security. The use of the
local radio station for press dispatches was forbidden. The slightest criticism or
speculation meant the immediate “canning” of a dispatch. The correspondents were so
dissatisfied and fractious that the sketchy public-relations system collapsed under the
strain.” 169 He proceeds to draw a direct, and unmistakable, line between MacArthur’s
seizure of the flow of information and the historiography of the campaign. White
confirms a belief that, based on his experience and his interviews with others, the events
of the campaign were reported correctly, but doubts openly that the facts were then
correctly interpreted by the world press. “In the first place,” White offers, “the campaign
was reported as a great tactical victory. In the second place it was interpreted as having
weighty tactical importance. Both interpretations are disputable. 170 While he does not go
as far as to paint it as an Allied failure, he readily concedes half a dozen points to the
contrary, the early Campaigns in New Guinea struck White as human tragedy writ large.
The vast majority of this tragedy wrought not by combat, but criminal
mismanagement. 171 Osmar White’s fury at the censorship, which he felt prevented his
accurately honoring the men and events he witnessed in New Guinea, that even before
the end of the war he declaimed, “Once news sources are officially controlled by
censorships, no individual writer can deflect by as much as a hair’s breadth the impact
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upon the public mind of the tale wartime leadership wants to tell. But history may judge
the relationship of dead facts” 172
The Australians did not trust MacArthur and MacArthur did not work well with
the Australians. Anxiety had fostered an initial elation at the arrival of a figure who had
been lauded as a heroic military genius in the press, but attitudes quickly soured. An
attitude of simmering resentment began to inhabit the Australians as their would-be
savior did little to convince the public that he was anything more than an aloof foreigner
arbitrarily imposed upon them, their generals, and their soldiers. MacArthur took to using
the Australians, along with the Japanese, the Navy, and bureaucrats in Washington, as a
catch-all object of blame for the routine failure of reality to live up to his
pronouncements. In combination with his refusal to integrate American and Australian
forces, itself a decision which led each to believe that they were enduring the majority of
the hardships, contributed an atmosphere of discontent among the Australians. 173
It seems clear that MacArthur arrived in Australia as a man more interested in
building a heroic narrative than in taking heroic action. The tale of a high-stakes game of
cat and mouse played between the aircraft transporting MacArthur’s party to Australia
and a series of Japanese pursuit craft was in American newspapers mere hours after his
bellicose declaration at Terowie Station. The account of Master Sergeant Dick Graf, the

White, 76.; Fitzsimmons 132
This manifested in several murders, a significant number of riots and counter riots, and innumerable
physical fights between and within the militaries. While MacArthur cannot be blamed for all of the friction
between the Allied contingents in Australia, at no point did he seriously attempt to reconcile the factions.
Gen. Thomas Blamey, head of the Australian Army forces (and in theory, if not in practice, the commander
of all Allied land forces under MacArthur), presented to MacArthur a detailed list of suggestions for
calming tensions following a particularly deadly series of riots in Brisbane in November 1942. He was, in
turn, studiously ignored and then contemptuously dismissed. Sporadic rioting and violence would continue
through the end of the war. Peter A Thompson and Robert Macklin, The Battle of Brisbane: Australians
and the Yanks at War, (Sydney: ABC Books, 2001), 212.
172
173

95
wireless operator on the flight, which held that there were no Japanese, or any other
dangers at all, would never garner the same attention. 174 The grandiloquent “I shall
return” line delivered by MacArthur upon meeting the Australian press, though among
the best publicized quotes by an American general in the whole history of the United
States, is rather coolly surmised by historians Richard H. Rovere and Arthur Schlesinger
to be little more than “Caesar-esque words… [that] left a rather ashen taste in the mouths
of men who knew they would be called on to return somewhat in advance of him.”175
MacArthur himself would spend much ink attempting to paint himself,
completely unironically, as an adamant critic of censorship. He recounts in his memoir a
desire by himself to publish the details of the conditions in which the prisoners of the
Japanese suffered and the unwillingness of the War Department to allow such macabre
detail. He suggests that there existed a conspiracy to keep American attention on Europe
and the refusal was rooted in a fear that “American public opinion would demand a
greater reaction against Japan” and that his opponents in Washington would not allow
that to happen. From there, MacArthur undertakes a diatribe decrying “managed news”
by “those in power.”176 “Here was the first move against that freedom of expression so
essential to liberty,” he writes, “It was the introduction, under a disarming slogan, of a
type of censorship which can easily become a menace to a free press and a threat to the
liberties of a free people.” Hypocrisy, it would seem, was not something that much
troubled the man.177
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Here too, Rogers’ insight to the dynamics of MacArthur’s decision-making
processes is valuable. Rogers confides that those references made by MacArthur to his
“staff,” usually in relation to decision making or conference, tended to mean whatever
MacArthur had taken it to mean at that given time. Often, his “staff” constituted no one
beyond Sutherland. 178 Keeping limited counsel, extremely limited in this case, is a
general’s prerogative, though the wisdom of such insular thought is questionable.
However, in framing his decisions, opinions, and conclusions as having been produced
by his “staff,” the weight of consensus follows his words more so than if they emanated
solely from his own eccentric mind. Over the course of the war, Rogers remembers just
two conferences in which the entire command staff of the GHQ was called to discuss
policy, both in Manila in the opening days of the war. According to Rogers, MacArthur
and Sutherland held no more after finding these initial meetings “clumsy and futile,” but
one struggles to imagine a less sympathetic biographer seeing it as anything more than a
disinterest in hearing dissenting opinions.179 Beyond youthful hero worship, Rogers had
other reasons to venerate MacArthur in his works. Rogers, who was in the days leading
up to the evacuation promoted from Private to Master Sergeant, was himself evacuated
alongside MacArthur. He was the old general’s favorite of Sutherland’s several
stenographers, a claim Rogers proudly makes in tandem with another that such favor
existed because he was the best. He also freely admits to understanding that it was on
such tenuous circumstance that he was included in the evacuation, quoting his supervisor
and fellow evacuee Francis Wilson’s take that he had been “chosen because he was doing
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his job. If the other steno[grapher] had been on the job… he would be here [in Australia]
and Rogers would be in a prison camp.” 180 A small anecdote in the scheme of history, but
everything to a soft and frail Rogers who would have entertained few doubts about the
odds of his survival in such a situation. He would never forget that it was his proximity
and loyalty to MacArthur that ensured his life.
The importance of loyalty as an explicit a criterion is a key contribution of Rogers
to the understanding of the decision making of MacArthur. Perhaps to excuse this,
Rogers takes pains to make plain that the list of evacuees was not put together by
MacArthur personally, but by his Chief of Staff, Sutherland. Rogers described the
selection process in his own words saying, “The priority slots were easily filled:
MacArthur, Mrs. MacArthur, young Arthur, his nurse, Ah Chu, Sutherland, Marshall, and
Huff. Morehouse was called over from Bataan because a doctor was needed. Admiral
Rockwell and Captain Ray were requested by the navy, and General George by the air
force in Washington.”181 The remainder, according to Rogers, “had been chosen by
Sutherland because of their loyalty [and] their predictable behavior.”182 Wilson and he
earned their places on Sutherland’s list because they “were ‘his.’” 183 Loyalty to
MacArthur or explicit order by the War Department were the only methods of escape.
The new staff that would reform around MacArthur in Melbourne would be built around
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such loyalty. Though his immediate benefactor, Sutherland, would eventually sour on his
superior, Rogers’s loyalty would never waver. 184
MacArthur was a man who chose his words carefully, preferring to dictate and
edit his thoughts – sometimes several times over – before sharing them. What interviews
he attended were with men and women carefully vetted by his staff and his press
conferences, when not delegated to his press officer Diller, consisted only of prepared
statements. He often refused to speak over the telephone, disliking the lack of time that
such tools allowed to carefully word a response or idea. His clerk, Rogers, would note,
“MacArthur despised telephones, was never comfortable with them, and used them only
when he felt that he had to – and then infrequently.” 185
A final point concerns one of the interesting divergences between works on
MacArthur’s experience in the Philippines. Soldiers’ songs are a fixture of every conflict.
Boredom is a powerful creative impetus and soldiers often spend the hours between
actions composing lyrics – alternately bawdy, brash, patriotic, and bitter – to fill the
silences. Such songs were indeed composed on Bataan by the men trapped there.
Historians and writers often take a moment to indulge in the flavor added by their
inclusion in a text. One included in almost every discussion of the topic is widely relayed:
We’re the battling bastards of Bataan,
No mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam,
No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces,
No rifles, no planes, no artillery pieces,
And nobody gives a damn.

Though their relationship would eventually break down (largely over Sutherland’s increasing
consternation at not being promoted to a theatre command of his own), Sutherland would always maintain a
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Not specifically critical of MacArthur but echoing a sentiment of having been
hung out to dry by the American government that the General shared, the verse even
finds its way into his own autobiography.186 Rarely, however, do his apologists include a
second, more cutting song composed by the men on Bataan:
Dugout Doug MacArthur lies a-shakin’ on The Rock,
Safe from all the bombers and from any sudden shock,
Dugout Doug is eating the best food on Bataan,
And his troops go starvin’ on.
Chorus:
Dugout Doug, come out from hiding,
Dugout Doug, come out from hiding,
Send to Franklin the glad tidings,
That his troops go starving on. 187
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TO WHAT END?
“Why” is perhaps the most important and most difficult to answer for any
historical investigator to produce. The identification of motivations is no less integral to
the analysis of a disheveled historiography than it is to the identification of an arsonist.
With the case of Douglas MacArthur, one can identify several potential catalysts for his
restructuring of the historical record both simple and non-intuitive. Certainly, he was
always a vain man with a flair for the dramatic. One, probably apocryphal, anecdote has
his one-time subordinate Dwight D. Eisenhower responding to a British woman’s query
on his having met MacArthur by quipping some form of, “Not only have I met
MacArthur, I studied dramatics under him for nine years.” 188 While the quote is difficult
to definitively pin to a primary source, the dramatics were real enough. These
“dramatics” were not limited to MacArthur’s own command. In 1944, MacArthur arrived
in Honolulu for a critical conference with President Roosevelt and Admiral Nimitz more
than an hour late riding in the back of a lavish open-topped touring car. As the motorcade
arrived at the ship on which the conference was to be held, the General sat waving like a
homecoming queen to a thronging crowd that in turn adored him for it. After bounding up
the gangplank towards the meeting he had left waiting, an ailing President Roosevelt
shook his hand and remarked on MacArthur’s decision to wear a leather jacket in Hawaii
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in July. MacArthur responded by loudly laughing and saying that “Sure it’s warm here,
but I just flew in and it’s pretty cold up there!” While Roosevelt did not press the subject,
the remark stuck with several others present who had not failed to notice that despite his
apparent haste, MacArthur had nonetheless found the time to shave, shower, and procure
a one of only two long-bodied convertibles on the island. 189
Immediate Gains – Deification or Death
In a radiogram signed by Marshall sent two days after Christmas specific mention
of MacArthur’s reports and press releases as giving an indication of “splendid conduct of
your [MacArthur’s] command” and goes on to say that “evidently [the] entire American
people have been profoundly impressed with your resistance to Japanese endeavors.” The
message further reports willingness to direct large amounts of air and naval assets to
further MacArthur’s cause. 190 In reality, his cause was already doomed. A doom not to be
laid solely at his feet, but doubtlessly exacerbated by his confusing and badly thought-out
command decisions. In fact, as the message arrived, MacArthur had only General
Wainwright and his excellent Philippine Scouts to thank for preventing the chaotic retreat
of the forces under MacArthur’s command from becoming an uncontrolled rout – perhaps
even complete capitulation – as he oversaw one of the most comprehensive defeats of an
American army in the modern era. Had a more accurate accounting of events been
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available to the War Department or the public, it is almost certain such support would not
have been offered.
MacArthur’s myth making bore tangible fruit almost immediately. He would, of
course, receive adulation and fame in quantities few, if any, military men have seen
since. 191 He would become a media darling, a political hopeful, and an inalienable fixture
in military planning, yet it is a less apparent benefit which was, perhaps, the most
pressing. MacArthur’s propagandizing very likely saved his life. It almost certainly saved
his job. Like Short and Kimmel, but with far fewer excuses, he saw the offensive
potential of the forces entrusted to him crippled on the first day of the war. Unlike his
unfortunate peers, he compounded his failure with an ill-conceived plan to defend the
entire archipelago, that ended in a disorganized retreat and the loss of most of the
supplies required to defend Bataan. Furthermore, his grandiose pronouncements and a
complete unwillingness to visit the front were anathema to morale to the point where he
was a subject of open derision by soldiers outside of his innermost circle. He might
justifiably, to invoke the analysis of Ronald Spector, have been relieved of command.192
Instead, he was made a hero.
A telegram from General George Marshall to MacArthur’s chief of staff
Sutherland arrived in February explaining that the War Department would “very much
like to award MacArthur with the Medal of Honor” and asking Sutherland to provide
them with any sort of action that might serve as a pretext for the award. The War
Department, however, quickly decided against waiting for a pretext and awarded the
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decoration “for a stout and heroic defense of the Philippines.” 193 The hero who the
American public was already beginning to build in their minds – a hero built on the back
of the bellicose accounts spread across every broadsheet in the land – was now
recognized by Uncle Sam himself.
The public adoration of his bombast was not without consequence, however. His
tales of Japanese spy networks resonated with many on the home front and his open
cheerleading for the internment of Japanese Americans would encourage many
Americans to support the imprisonment and disenfranchisement of their countrymen. An
“International News Summary” from a press release promulgated by his office on March
7, 1943 read:
Violation of constitutional rights! As if the Japanese understood what
constitutional rights are! To continue unhampered their espionage activities and their fifth
column work – this must be their idea of rights guaranteed by the American constitution
… The privilege has already been enjoyed and abused by the Japanese, but no rights have
been established … Consider for a moment the revenge that could be wreaked on the
Japanese nationals by the justly indignant and outraged populace in America. … Those of
us who were in Manila and saw the signal lights and flares at night and discovered the
secret radio stations know that no national of Japan can ever be trusted. The hospitality of
a friendly country is enjoyed and abused for years by the Japanese and for only one
purpose – to betray. It is ludicrous in the extreme for a people who have abused the
hospitality of a nation like America to bemoan the loss of their so-called “constitutional
rights” when, as guests of the American people, they have underhandly done all they
could to tear the American constitution into tatters and undermine the stability of the
American government. America has learned from bitter experience that the polite bow
and smile of a Japanese national serve only to conceal a black heart and a traitor’s
conscience. And wisely the United States government is depriving them of their
opportunities for treachery. 194
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While the press releases and news bulletins from MacArthur’s Corregidor headquarters
took on an increasingly paranoid and frenetic tone as his military situation worsened,
Americans nonetheless placed disproportionate weight on his words. There is no way to
tell how much blood was spilled or how many lives were destroyed because of
MacArthur’s frantic and largely fantastical invocations of fifth columnists and saboteurs
witnessed by “Those of us who were in Manila,” but it is unlikely to be none.195
The benefits of celebrity, however, did not take long to reach the Philippines.
American national morale had suffered badly through three months of defeat and
disappointment and in MacArthur the home front had found itself a figure that offered
hope. Such a figure could not be allowed to fall into the hands of the Japanese, so it was
arranged for MacArthur and his chosen staff to be quietly spirited away from their
Corregidor hideout and ferried to Australia.196 It is notable that the less bellicose
Wainwright, certainly the outstanding American field commander of the war to that
point, was not so recovered.197
Consideration, at the very least, should be spared for Wainwright. As he was left
in command of a doomed force with explicit orders not to surrender, the dual weights of
the suffering of his soldiers on one side and his duty as an officer on the other must have
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been crushing. The attempts by MacArthur to command the operations of Wainwright
from Melbourne would not have eased his woes either. 198 When the War Department
attempted to communicate directly with Wainwright, MacArthur sent a vicious cable to
Wainwright demanding that all communication go through him. The War Department
ultimately sided with Wainwright and the incident has long been pointed to by
MacArthur’s critics and defenders alike as an example of the old general’s tendency to
micromanage, yet there is a more sinister interpretation. It is possible that MacArthur did
not want Wainwright discussing him with figures in Washington and wanted control of
communication between the two.
A message was sent to MacArthur and Sutherland on May 2 by General Beebe –
behind the back of Wainwright – urging them to evacuate Wainwright in the same
manner in which they had evacuated MacArthur. Beebe argued that Wainwright’s
knowledge of and experience in handling Japanese tactics exceeded that of any other
officers on which the United States might call. He implored them to order Wainwright to
make his escape as, “he is a soldier, and will only move if ordered to do so,” and offered
himself as a replacement to succeed him for the duties involved in the inevitable
surrender. He was steadfastly refused.199
The reply to this request, signed by Sutherland, insisted that it was beyond their
authority to organize such an action as well as implying that Wainwright was
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indispensable for the defense of Corregidor, while dryly stating that Beebe himself
offered no such military utility.200 This is of note, petty slights against Beebe
notwithstanding, because while technically the authority for such action rested with the
War Department, there would not have been any practical resistance to a request by
MacArthur for Wainwright’s evacuation. It is speculative, though not beyond
consideration, that MacArthur viewed Wainwright as a personal threat. Himself a wellrespected commander with a no-nonsense reputation, Wainwright held a service record as
long as MacArthur’s. He, unlike MacArthur, habitually stood on the front lines and had
earned a great deal of affection from those under him for his willingness to share their
hardships. Were such a valuable reservoir of tactical experience to be extricated from the
Philippines, the War Department would naturally waste little time in debriefing him.
MacArthur would have been fully aware that any debriefing of Wainwright would
provide a wildly different accounting of events to that which had been fed to them by
MacArthur. Furthermore, Wainwright was of perfectly sufficient rank and standing to be
offered MacArthur’s position and it is not beyond the realm of possibility to suggest that
were such revelations to be made MacArthur would find himself relieved of command. 201
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Legacy
Beyond the concerns of immediate position and influence, MacArthur was
consciously concerned about how he would be remembered. Though his father and
grandfather had both enjoyed long lives, and with nothing to suggest that he would not
himself enjoy as many years, Douglas MacArthur was halfway through his seventh
decade by the conclusion of the Second World War. This may have been, itself, an
agonist of his historiographical manipulations, but MacArthur’s own writing leaves little
doubt that he had always seen himself as an important figure in history. The tenth, and
final, section of his 1964 memoir consists mostly of transcriptions of hagiographic
speeches attributed to one or another figure of contemporary importance in which he is
the beneficiary of vindication and veneration. These are exemplified, both in tone and
intent, by a line he attributes to Connecticut Senator Thomas Dodd, “The universal
acclaim for General MacArthur… is in my mind more than just a deserved tribute to a
very great hero. It is well a symptom of a yearning there and throughout the world for
that dynamic, resolute, indominable American leadership of which General MacArthur
was and is the symbol.”202 Whatever the actual ubiquity of this or the numerous similar
sentiments included in the final section of the work and regardless of reasonable
questions of veracity and chicanery, it can be certain that MacArthur envisioned himself
as both a contemporary and historical hero.

The universally exultant praise of MacArthur, his ideals, and his actions that makes up the final section
of his book is, like the rest of the work, completely unburdened by citations or supporting evidence.
MacArthur, Reminiscences, 422.
202

108
President MacArthur
MacArthur’s family had long been a fixture of Washington politics. He was
himself a distant relation of Franklin Roosevelt and it is not unreasonable to assume that
the presidency was always somewhere in his ambitions. He would never ultimately
achieve the office, but the notoriety offered by his public image as a war hero provided
him a very real opportunity for its attainder. His admiration within certain corners of the
Republican Party following his stern handling of the “communist” Bonus Army, but the
scandal and the fallout would prove too damaging to his public image to entertain seeking
office at the time. His removal to the Philippines served, among much else, to give the
public and the press time to cool on his perceived authoritarianism, but it was clear
MacArthur’s aspirations extended further afield than the command he then occupied.
MacArthur’s aspirations to high office were among his worst kept secrets. As
early as the late 1930s he had agents in Washington sounding out the possibilities of a
shot at the Republican presidential nomination.203 The 1940 election proved to be
inopportune, but a future run remained on the cards. The legend of MacArthur played
well with American audiences and in the early months of the war Roosevelt looked as
though he would be vulnerable in the 1944 election. His promises to keep America out of
war had come to naught and the only man meeting apparent success against the enemies
of America was MacArthur. Though this was absolutely vainglorious theater, it was more
than just vainglorious theatre for its own sake. A May 1942 Gallup poll found him to be
one of the top four men considered “Presidential material for 1944.” A survey in Fortune
magazine saw his name receive more support for “an important position in the
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presidential administration” than Republican heavyweights Wendell Willkie and Thomas
Dewey combined. 204
That MacArthur was disinterested in the opportunity was doubtful. His longserving aide recalled that the “idea wasn’t unpleasant to MacArthur” and recalled being
ordered to “keep an ear to the ground” in regard to the Republican nomination when
departing for a trip home in 1943. Turner Catledge, journalist for and future editor of the
New York Times, met with MacArthur shortly after Roosevelt’s reelection concluding that
the General displayed “some jealously of Roosevelt” and “In private he talked a great
deal in political terms, far more than other generals.” “I believe,” Catledge concludes,
“that he was hoping for a popular avalanche of support… When the avalanche did not
come, he backed out of the picture reluctantly.”205 Perhaps most tellingly, in December of
1943 General Robert Wood, a key figure in laying the groundwork for a MacArthur
candidacy, informed MacArthur that he had been entered into a presidential primary in
Illinois. Wood advised MacArthur that the timing was inopportune, and it was best if
MacArthur’s name was withdrawn from consideration. Wood included with his message
a certificate for MacArthur to sign renouncing his involvement. MacArthur never signed
it.206
While the evidence is circumstantial, it strains credulity to imagine that all of his
chief lieutenants and so many high-profile Republican politicians were engaged in
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discourse on MacArthur’s political prospects without his approval. When Senators
Brewster, Chandler, Lodge, Mead, and Russell visited him in Port Moresby in September
1943, they found him generous with his time and keenly interested in political
developments. In contrast, MacArthur’s response to Eleanor Roosevelt’s arrival in
Australia a few days earlier was to refuse to allow her to visit Port Moresby while himself
refusing to meet with her in Australia. As his practical responsibilities at the time were
minimal and Ms. Roosevelt’s stay not insignificant in length, D. Clayton James – usually
an exceedingly neutral biographer – speculates that his avoidance was most likely due to
a belief that pictures of the two of them together would damage his political standing
among Republican voters. 207
He spent much of 1943 working through political allies in Washington to garner
support for his candidacy and preformed reasonably well in the early Republican
contests. 208 Unfortunately for MacArthur, Roosevelt was by then in a much stronger
political position than he had been in at the start of the war. The war was progressing well
under the leadership and victory had begun to seem an inevitability. There was less broad
appeal in a man whose great selling point was being antithetic to the incumbent
President, but a more flexible man might still have had a chance. However, he was
hampered by distance, poor political instincts, and a complete unwillingness to heed the
advice of his allies in Washington the sum of which saw most of his key backers abandon
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him by mid-1944. 209 A speculative bid for the nomination at the Republican Convention
would prove to be an embarrassing failure and MacArthur moved quickly to distance
himself from the attempt, denying in his memoirs any knowledge of or involvement with
the project.210
A 1948 move for the office failed to get off the ground and a final attempt to
contest the presidency in the 1952 election ended in ignominy. MacArthur, riding a wave
of renewed popularity following his dismissal by President Truman, undertook a
speaking tour that devolved quickly from selling out entire stadia to struggling to fill even
modest venues. Crowds quickly tired of speeches that amounted to little more than
whining about real and perceived slights against him by Truman and praising himself.211
At the Republican convention MacArthur hoped that favorites Dwight Eisenhower and
Robert Taft would create a deadlock that he could then step into as a compromise
candidate. Once that failed to materialize, MacArthur spurned his one-time subordinate
and threw his support behind Taft, who proceeded to lose decisively to Eisenhower. The
office would never again be within his reach but, for a decade at least, he had come close
enough for him and others to seriously entertain the idea.
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MacArthur’s Memory
The legacy left by MacArthur’s enormous popularity with the American public is
hard to quantify. Certainly, the Medal of Honor he was awarded was the result of
congressional pressure rather than military achievement. America was blanketed with
streets, public works, parks, dams, children, and even a dance step named in his honor.
The National Father’s Day Committee named MacArthur “Number One Father for
1942.” June 13 of the same year was dubbed “Douglas MacArthur Day.” 212 In 1955, it
was proposed in Congress (though the proposal went nowhere) that he be named
“General of the Armies,” a title ultimately awarded to only two men.213 A broad
assembly of leadership awards are disseminated by the General Douglas MacArthur
Foundation to junior officers and cadets who have demonstrated “duty, honor, and
country.” His 1964 death was followed by a state funeral and placement of his body in
the Rotunda of the United States Capitol where it lay in state for two days. 150,000
people, according to the Army’s official estimate, filed past the bier. 214 John K. Fairbank
echoed the sentiments of many in the years following MacArthur’s death when he
declared MacArthur “brave beyond belief, courting death hundreds of times to set his
troops an example. He was in fact our greatest soldier” 215
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Those who would venerate him constitute the effect, rather than the impetus, for
his legend so long surviving the man. Arthur Herman ponders in his work Douglas
MacArthur: American Warrior over the curious lack of literature written on MacArthur
during his lifetime – itself a curious statement as Herman’s work cites multiple
biographies of the man published prior to 1964. Herman does, however, have a point in
suggesting that a relatively greater quantity of work has been published since. 216 In no
small part is this due to the man himself. MacArthur zealously guarded his own legacy
and his zeal – as much as any other factor – contributed to its longevity and ubiquity.
Juxtaposition
The preceding sections of this work, though examining in detail only an
exceedingly modest segment of a vast career, clearly illuminate the will and capability of
Douglas MacArthur and his followers to wage successful war against any inconvenient
truths. The purpose of this section is to reiterate how unorthodox and unprecedented the
actions of this party were through juxtaposition with figures that may on the surface seem
similar. Three figures contemporary to MacArthur, George Patton, Dwight Eisenhower,
and Bernard Montgomery, find themselves compelling subjects for comparison.
It requires little imagination to draw connections between George Patton and
Douglas MacArthur. Neither man, even at the outset of hostilities, could be described as
young, humble, or modest. Patton, though five years younger than MacArthur, was a
product of the same old Army and had participated in the same military adventures in
Mexico and France. Each man carefully maintained an image of a strong-jawed man-in-
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the-trenches despite their experience of the Second World War involving little, if any,
proximity to actual combat.217 There, however, is where the similarities end.
In contrast with MacArthur (and in spite of MacArthur’s own breathless accounts)
Patton actually did participate in combat during the First World War. 218 The effects his
front-line experience had on his psyche are subjects for speculation more than anything
else, but Patton would gain a well-earned reputation for ensuring that the soldiers under
his command were among the best-supplied of the whole war. It was, in fact, to his
soldiers that Patton mostly pandered.219 He drove them exceptionally hard, enforced
brutal discipline, and subordinated all concerns to an extremely aggressive style of
warfare. His meticulous supply, brusque personality, and conspicuous imagery were all
consciously intended to keep his soldiers’ approval. 220
MacArthur, on the other hand, desired above all else the adulation of the
American public. While Patton’s experience with public opinion in America was (both
for better and for worse) an effect of his relationship with his soldiers, MacArthur’s
relationship with his soldiers was entirely built around his courting of public opinion in
the United States. Patton adopted a controversial and occasionally physical style of
interacting with his soldiers and leant into their loose speech, casual racism, and

It bears repeating that neither man’s position necessitated nor realistically lent itself to actual
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combative aggression. MacArthur instead carefully courted and curated his press corps
and rarely found time to offer more than the occasional perfunctory remark to a departing
combat unit as he spent the vast majority of his time hundreds of miles from anything that
might be described as a front. 221
This distance from combat seems a point of significantly greater insecurity for
MacArthur. In January 1944 an article by former Fortune and Time editor John McCarten
attacking the partisan overtones developing around the MacArthur mythos mentioned,
not inaccurately, MacArthur’s failure to visit the front in Bataan and New Guinea. A
theatre commander with no operational or practical reason to do so, MacArthur should
have felt no need to defend his position. Instead, he travelled some three hundred miles
north of Brisbane, where Eichelberger’s I Corps was engaged in training exercises in the
hilly jungle outside Rockhampton with his Press Officers Diller and Lehrbas and a cohort
of photographers. He spent the day being photographed in and around Eichelberger’s
command post before a somewhat puzzled Eichelberger was “directed to send all
negatives to his [MacArthur’s] headquarters and he selected the ones which were not to
be destroyed. A number of these were sent to all the papers in the United States under

Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, (New York: Viking Press, 1950), 99.; The episode
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such captions as ‘General MacArthur at the Front with Gen. Eichelberger in New
Guinea.’” 222
MacArthur, incontrovertibly, was a masterful and incisive manager of the media
of his day. Patton might generously be called a media disaster. Where the former
carefully practiced and revised even his “impromptu” speeches the latter made new
enemies nearly every time he spoke. 223 Though famed, even in his own time, as a fiery
speaker, he was consistently outmaneuvered when it came time to commit his words to
print. He was, in 1945 alone, characterized in American press as having declared both
Democrats and Republicans analogous to Nazis, having insulted the valor of dead
soldiers, and having declared that it was the destiny of America to rule the world. 224
Though often mischaracterized or exaggerated, Patton always presented an image of
himself to the American public that was never going to inspire universal acclaim. 225
Finally, Patton died before his legacy was open for debate. While MacArthur
would enjoy at least a decade at the end of his life in which to defend and curate the
complete legacy of “Douglas MacArthur,” Patton suffered a spinal injury in a low-speed
car accident in late 1945 and died a few days later. Though likely staring down retirement
and reflection at the time, Patton had yet to organize and present his own analysis of his
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life and achievements. His historical legacy is, as a consequence, shaped mostly by how
he was viewed by others. 226
While Patton’s position never awarded him the total control that MacArthur’s did,
the position of MacArthur’s former lieutenant, Dwight Eisenhower, certainly did. He
ended the Second World War as the Supreme Commander of all Allied forces in Europe,
and would, only a few years later, find himself head of the armies of NATO and,
eventually, President of the United States. Riding overwhelming social, political, and
military authority to what would ultimately be the first presidency to be held by a
Republican in a generation, Eisenhower would have means to edit his legacy in quantity
and scale of which MacArthur could only ever have dreamed. Yet, he did not.
While Eisenhower held equal, and ultimately greater, authority relative to his
former boss, his position was subject to far more scrutiny. Geography, no less than other
enabling factors, facilitated MacArthur’s deception. Between 1936 and 1951 MacArthur
rarely operated within the same hemisphere as anyone who exceeded either his de facto
or de jure authority. While Eisenhower could and did exercise similar military authority,
the limitations of technology and military priority granted to MacArthur a near-total
monopoly on the flow of information that was simply not possible for Eisenhower.
Eisenhower’s later service as President further invited examination of his service. Though
popular, Eisenhower was not without political enemies. His entire life and career were
subject to analysis and reanalysis for far longer than MacArthur, whose legacy was

Purely for the purposes of conjecture, the author wishes to note, if not to draw too much analysis from,
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considered a complete and past thing of historical significance for more than a decade
before his death.
Eisenhower’s profile also proved more conducive to an electoral campaign than
MacArthur’s. A presidential campaign necessarily includes significant public inquest into
a candidate’s actions and character. While Eisenhower’s public image was built on an
identity as an administrator and delegator as much as military acumen, MacArthur’s
public image, in contrast, was one of caricature. The 1944 election cycle was far enough
removed from the hectic opening days of the war that the voting public responded
unenthusiastically even to tentative attempts to reconcile the hero they had constructed in
those tense times with their expectations for a presidential candidate. The following
election cycles saw the temporal gap further diminish the electoral appeal of the bellicose
and uncompromising caricature of MacArthur.227
Ultimately, Eisenhower did not attempt to cynically construct a favorable
narrative as his former commander had done largely because he simply did not want to.
Eisenhower was proud; he famously chaffed at the slights visited upon him by
MacArthur and Sutherland during their time together, but he was not overtly egotistical.
It was this quality that ultimately won him the position of Supreme Commander.228 He
was not a combatant in any of the wars his nation took part in during his life, but nor did
he ever pretend to be. He was an administrator, an organizer, a logistician, and uniformly
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brilliant at each. He curated subordinates, Omar Bradley, Mark Clark, and George Patton
among them, who led armies in the field and allowed them the attention and adulation
they won. Where MacArthur insulted, humiliated, and removed commanders who refused
to consign the credit for their victories to him, Eisenhower displayed no interest in
coopting the successes of his subordinates. While it is possible, though unlikely, that
Eisenhower might have pulled off a deception similar to that managed by MacArthur and
his partisans, it simply was not conducive to his character.
Bernard Montgomery offers another, and for our purposes a final, interesting
comparison. He alone among MacArthur’s immediate contemporaries (here understood
as the commanders of Allied armies) shared a sort of exalted ubiquity with his nation.229
Much like MacArthur, Montgomery was difficult to work with, abrasive, and openly
derisive of his Allied peers. He was generally disinterested in communicating his
intentions to his allies and a well-earned reputation for summarily dismissing those who
displeased him. 230
Montgomery, however, was not a British MacArthur. Like Patton, he had
participated in heavy combat in the First World War and was himself shot twice. Also,
like Patton he undertook a deliberate campaign of conspicuous bravery in the field
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explicitly to inspire confidence in his soldiers and adopted a media-handling style
intended to curry their favor – not that of the wider public. 231 Inside the High Command
Montgomery had to deal with both superiors and rivals. These were not nominal and on
the other side of an ocean, but very real and nearby. Any attempt at deception in real time
would be both readily noticeable and quickly taken advantage of by robust contingents
within both the British and Allied militaries who were decidedly against the Englishman.
British Air Marshal Arthur Tedder in particular regularly and publicly demanded that
Eisenhower sack Montgomery and it remains one of the Field Marshal’s great
accomplishments that he was able to maintain his position within the Allied high
command against attacks from all sides. 232
Like MacArthur, Montgomery was blessed with a long life and a critical pen.
Remaining in service until 1958, at the time already past seventy, he lived nearly a
further two decades. He used this time to very openly court controversy through his
actions and publications. While MacArthur’s memoirs were published only just before
his death, Montgomery’s were published shortly after his retirement. In these he openly
attacked very nearly every commander he had ever served with or under and, unlike
MacArthur, no cult of personality had grown up around Montgomery. He had at least as
many enemies as he had supporters and his accusations were taken as little more than
embittered opinions to be indulged or discarded on a case-by-case basis. He was never
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given the free hand to guide the creation of primary sources that so blessed MacArthur’s
fortunes.
This is what makes MacArthur’s deception so remarkable. No specific element of
his deception is, in isolation, unique. He held extremely uncommon, but not unique,
quantities of both de facto and de jure influence within the American military. His control
of the flow of information, a circumstance aided immeasurably by the limitations of the
technology of the time and the distances involved, was no greater than that of many
historical colonial governors. It was not unprecedented that he be venerated as a hero in
the early days of the war; little shame can be attached to the very human instinct to
embrace any apparent relief in a storm of bad news. The pettiness and narcissism with
which he promoted himself at the expense of his rivals – real and imaginary – might even
be said to be depressingly common. However, it is extremely rare for all of those factors
to be in play for one person at one time. Emperors, dictators, and autocrats alone hold
such overwhelming tools for the shaping of a historical narrative – and their accounts are
accordingly viewed with deep suspicion by historians. MacArthur was not an Emperor.
Despite being, for a time, more powerful than all but a handful of historical figures have
ever been, his position was ostensibly one that fell far short of the threshold maintained
by historians for potential agents of historical manipulation. This critical, but deceptively
subtle, addition to the formula is what makes MacArthur truly unique.
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CONCLUSION
Opinions on Douglas MacArthur run the gamut from veneration to bitter
contempt. While the conclusion of this study is one that paints MacArthur as, at the very
least, manipulative and scheming, it is important to distinguish this impression from one
of “good” or “bad.” MacArthur was a complicated man with an undeniable spark of
genius. It was perhaps not the spark of military genius he was convinced he possessed,
but he was a masterful manipulator of the media of his day and magnetic character who
inspired intense loyalty in those closest to him. Paul Rogers, MacArthur’s young clerk,
would write of him half a century hence as having been an “Olympian God.”233
Sycophantic or no, such intense idolization does not come from nowhere.
MacArthur’s position granted him access to more information than can reasonably
be processed by one person. The job of summarizing and relaying the thousands of
reports that each day painted a picture of the war as it happened fell to a cadre of
subordinates, who often were themselves responsible for executing the resulting
commands. That MacArthur might not have been aware of minute details is eminently
excusable, that he would relay information that significantly misrepresented events – or
else created events altogether – is not. While the opportunity for MacArthur and his
supporters to explicitly order the creation of material that eschewed information and
interpretations harmful to MacArthur or his legacy never quite existed, it is clear from the
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cases discussed in this work that there was both ample implicit motivation for such action
and more than enough access to accurate information to rule out the theory that ignorance
was, as has been suggested in the past by his critics, the primary cause of his inaccurate
reporting.
In analyzing the Clark Field debacle, we noted the remarkable lack of detail in the
preliminary reports to the War Department followed by reports that were extremely
generous in their assessment of the performance of the men of USAFFE at all levels. The
narrative emerging from MacArthur’s GHQ shifted from one of complete preparedness,
to complete unpreparedness and ignorance, before a final shift on January 23, 1942, to a
desperately implausible narrative of pre-cognizance. 234 The increasingly biased and
dogmatic reporting emanating from MacArthur’s GHQ in the early months of 1942
served multiple purposes. First, and most immediately relevant, they protected
MacArthur from the same repercussions experienced by Short and Kimmel and secured
continued support of his operations – particularly in terms of finances. Second, the
apparently vicious toll he reported (himself) taking on the Japanese led to a sharp rise in
popularity for MacArthur among the American people. This led directly to the decision to
evacuate him, and his chosen staff, to Australia. Considering the hardship endured by the
men he abandoned, this almost certainly saved many of the lives of those he felt most
valuable. Finally, the accounting from MacArthur’s office of the opening events of the
American entry into the war do much to safeguard a legacy that was very much open to

This release, which Eisenhower diplomatically referred to in his diary as “flamboyant,” included a
recommendation that Sutherland be given MacArthur’s position in the event of “my death.” Eisenhower
commented only that MacArthur was “showing he still liked his boot lickers.” Eisenhower, The
Eisenhower Diaries, 44.
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questioning at the time. His military career to that point was long and decorated, but close
and unsympathetic examination of those decorations could easily come to suspect that
many of his decorations had an air of having been either awarded for political reasons or
having been awarded by the man himself. 235 Were his final act as a military leader to
have been the decisive defeat he did in fact oversee in the Philippines to an enemy
broadly perceived to have been both technologically and intrinsically inferior, it would
not have taken much for an unfavorable biographer to paint him as a fraud who failed
spectacularly in his first trial by fire and whose career had been built on nepotism and
connections. Presented instead as a grizzled old veteran who was able to extract a
sanguinary price from an overwhelming enemy while being abandoned by corrupt
bureaucrats in Washington, he became a figure of veneration in the United States. He
became, instead, someone who could embody the frustrations of a people losing a war
they felt they should be winning.
These sentiments could easily have shifted following the fall of the Philippines
and MacArthur’s conspicuous lack of falling with it. Much has been made, at the time
and in years since, by MacArthur and his defenders of his agonizing over the decision to
escape. Indeed, questioning eyes do not take long to fix their gaze on a captain who
almost alone escapes a sinking ship. The primary sources indicate little contemporary
consternation over the decision to leave but note a great deal of latitude having been
insisted upon by MacArthur in how the escape was to be presented. The terms “escape”
and “evacuate” are not used in any statements to the press, but rather “breaking through”
and “counterattack” to give an impression of MacArthur having opted to undertake
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something even more personally dangerous than remaining at his post. It also implied,
and as discussed previously was used as supporting evidence by several historians, that
MacArthur expected a force to be waiting in Australia capable of launching an immediate
counterattack at the Philippines. None of the messages exchanged between him and the
War Department give any indication of this belief. Several messages from MacArthur
insist that such actions should be taken, but these same messages equally decry that such
action has not been taken.236
Historians broadly trust one another. 237 Historians of all stripes approach
arguments and evidence with care and practiced suspicion, but rarely question facts
recited by their peers. Facts are generally easy enough to prove or to disprove that to
include information that is objectively wrong would be massively damaging ones’
reputation. It is sensible enough, therefore, to assume that a professional would take such
care to avoid factual mistakes as for them to be nonexistent. The problem, in turn,
manifests as something of a historiological Trojan Horse. In essence it exists where a
historian cites another historian’s accounting of something – usually auxiliary to their
actual argument and meant only to provide context – but in doing so eschews the initial
context.
For instance, a historian may carefully record that MacArthur later claimed that
he was made to leave the Philippines against his will and spend an entire chapter

MacArthur also insists in these messages that the whole of the American Navy, Atlantic and Pacific, be
launched at the Japanese mainland “while all of their forces were attacking the Philippines.” It goes without
saying that, so few Japanese forces were committed to the Philippines by the time these messages were sent
in February and March 1942 that they were themselves heavily outnumbered. It also goes without saying
that no sane commander in MacArthur’s position could have earnestly believed the Navy would entertain
any such actions nor, at any rate, was the Navy inclined to indulge him.
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discussing the veracity of that claim. A second historian, writing on a different part of the
war, might cite the first to contextualize their study with something along the lines of “as
_____ was happening, MacArthur was demanding his superiors allow him to remain in
the Philippines” Such an anecdote is flavorful, a nice touch in a field often lacking in
flair, and apparently borne out by seeking out the cited passage. A further historian might
use the second historian’s work as amply reputable to do something similar. In a field
with some of the greatest density of literature ever garnered by a single topic, much of
which not specifically an analysis of MacArthur or the South Pacific, these sort of
inaccuracies – once a part of the historical discussion – can proliferate rapidly.
The prevalence of the baseless story, as Walter Borneman puts it, about
MacArthur’s supposed desire to fight and die alongside the men on Bataan serves in a
way to proliferate the narrative. John Dower, in his 1986 book War Without Mercy
repeats the claim in a section that actually had remarkably little to do with MacArthur. As
the point is not integral to any arguments Dower is attempting to make, he simply cites
Costello’s The Pacific War to support his anecdote. Costello cites exclusively post-war
interviews from MacArthur or those with MacArthur’s best interests at heart. A
seemingly innocent oversight, but one resultant in another reputable historian putting
their name to the MacArthur narrative. 238
Why does it matter? Why invoke the language of malicious intent in the case of
one of America’s most venerated generals? For decades, the narrative surrounding
MacArthur’s reporting of the war has been one of “multiple perspectives” with even his
critics conceding that there was every chance that MacArthur himself believed the story
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he spun. To do so gives the historian a shield from accusations that they sought to attack
the legacy of the general. That is no longer acceptable. The repercussions for criticizing
the “most dangerous man in America” are no longer too great to bear.
Douglas MacArthur was a fascinating figure. He was charismatic, charming, and
enigmatic. He possessed a cunning that could eviscerate his rivals and enchant his
supplicants. He was the sort of figure who could command a room in absolute silence
through force of personality alone. He was also vindictive, vainglorious, and petty. He
was a case study in narcissism and megalomania. He had a suspicious aversion to a fight
and boasted about his bravery just a little too loud and from just far enough away from
danger to raise an eyebrow. Hanson’s The Second World Wars, a work not at all critical
of MacArthur, nonetheless concedes that one of the great successes of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff was their ability to support the “megalomaniac (and politically untouchable)
Douglas MacArthur… without turning over too many strategic decisions to his oftenunsteady judgement.” 239 He was not, in the words of Thomas Hart, “altogether sane.” 240
He also lied. He lied not just within the confines of operational secrecy, but freely. He
built an entire character, an entire legacy, an entire American Hero, with lies.
Historical records should accurately reflect the actions of the figures recorded
therein. Douglas MacArthur failed to prevent catastrophic loss of life and materiel – in
measure at least equal to that which had seen his contemporaries, Short and Kimmel,
relieved in Hawaii – despite having had more than adequate warning of attack. He led his
army to, and ultimately only his innermost circle away from, the greatest single military
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defeat in the history of the United States. He profited immensely from his political
connections with the Philippine government – particularly with President Quezon – not
only through the small fortune he secured from the Philippine treasury before making his
escape, but from half a decade of extortionate pay and benefits in exchange for a promise
to build a national army that would eventually prove completely incapable of fulfilling its
charter. 241 His name should be listed alongside Custer, Varus, Burgoyne, and any other
men whose slavery to their hubris littered their legacies with the bodies of other men’s
sons. Instead, he became a hero.
The time has come to acknowledge, in the open and in plain language, that
MacArthur knowingly – through his own actions and those taken on his behalf – sought
to deceive the world in the service of his immediate ambitions and long-term legacy. If
the fantasy he created is allowed to continue to proliferate within respectable works, his
version of events will bear the veneer of implicit validity afforded by endurance. In an era
where an intellectual cancer has taken root among a not-insignificant minority, in the
form of the belief that facts can be changed through repetition of lies, it is past time for
historians to stop shrinking from this task. To admit the propagandistic lies of a
vainglorious megalomaniac to pollute the historiography of one of the key moments in

It is of note that the revelation of the transfer of about $1,000,000 USD from the Philippine Treasury to
MacArthur and his staff was not known outside of MacArthur’s innermost circle, a single-digit number of
officers at the War Department, and President Roosevelt until the story was broken by historian Carol
Petillo in 1979. The topic was, however, clearly on the minds of MacArthur and his staff as Reports,
published in 1966, includes an unprompted and defensive accounting of having taken “immediate action”
to turn over 20,000,000 pesos to Quezon. This sum had made available by Roosevelt and the Congress for
the government of the Philippines to put towards relief of the civilian population. MacArthur was not at any
point in a position to dictate or handle such a transfer, so the unprompted accounting of his not-embezzling
Philippine funds makes little sense other than as a rebuttal for future accusations.
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the history of the United States for fear of repercussions or fallout only invites further
men, richer in ambition than morality, to imitation.
MacArthur is a character for the ages – a fascinating man to be studied and
debated – but no longer one to be indulged. Ronald H. Spector wrote that Americans
invented themselves a hero, an opinion that held quite a cutting edge in 1985. Nearly four
decades on, the statement’s edge seems all too dull. Douglas MacArthur, the character,
the man, the myth, invented himself. While Americans let him, they can be complicit in
the lie no longer.
There is too much at stake.
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A: Characters
All persons are here identified by – and only by – their role during the period that
constitutes their involvement in this study and is not inclusive of later authors unless an
unavoidably significant connection to events exists. (i.e., Paul Rogers is listed due to his
role as MacArthur’s clerk, but Gavin Long – who was a war correspondent at the time –
is not due to his lack of involvement in MacArthur’s headquarters, chain of command, or
decision making.)

Arnold, Henry “Hap”: Commander of the United States Army Air Forces (and equivalent
as the organization underwent restructuring.)
Beebe, Lewis: MacArthur’s Assistant Chief of Staff during the Bataan-Corregidor
campaign, later Wainwright’s Chief of Staff.
Blamey, Thomas: Commander in Chief of Australian Military Forces and Commander of
Allied Land Forces in the SWPA under MacArthur.
Brereton, Lewis: Commander of the United States Far East Air Force
Cooper, Isabel R.: MacArthur’s Filipina mistress. Cooper was no more than sixteen when
she became the mistress of the then-50-year-old MacArthur. She was kept by MacArthur
in a luxurious sort of imprisonment in Washington D.C. and was no more than nineteen
when the relationship threatened to become public, and he divested himself of her with a
payment of $15,000.
Curtin, John: Prime Minister of Australia and Minister for Defence from October 1941
until his death in July 1945.
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Diller, LaGrande “Pick”: MacArthur’s press and public relations officer for the duration
of the war.
Eichelberger, Robert: Commander of the United States Eighth Army
Eisenhower, Dwight: MacArthur’s former assistant, he would be Supreme Commander of
Allied Forces in North Africa by the end of 1942, and Supreme Commander of Allied
Forces in Europe by the end of 1943.
Lehrbas, Lloyd: Press Relations officer for MacArthur.
Hart, Thomas: Commander in Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet from 1939 to 1942.
Hoover, Herbert: President of the United States of America 1929-1933.
Kimmel, Husband: Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet. Relieved after
Pearl Harbor.
King, Ernest: Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and Chief of Naval
Operations
MacArthur, Arthur Jr.: Father of Douglas. Medal of Honor recipient. Governor General
of the Philippines.
MacArthur, Douglas: Commander in Chief United States Forces Far East and
subsequently Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area.
Marshall, George: Chief of Staff of the United States Army
Montgomery, Bernard: Commander in Chief of Allied Ground Forces (Normandy). Later
served in reduced capacity as head of the 21st Army Group before post-war roles as Chief
of the Imperial General Staff and Deputy Supreme Commander in Europe.
Nimitz, Chester: Commander in Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet from 1941 to
1945. Succeeding Kimmel.
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Patton, George: Commander of the United States Third Army
Pearson, Drew: Influential anti-conservative newspaper columnist. Sued by MacArthur
for defamation before the case was dropped amidst threats to reveal MacArthur’s
mistress.
Pershing, John: Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Force in World War
One.
Quezon, Manuel: President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines 1935-1944.
Rogers, Paul: Personal clerk and stenographer to Sunderland and MacArthur for the
duration of the war.
Roosevelt, Franklin D.: President of the United States 1933-1945.
Short, Walter: Commander in Chief of Army forces in Hawaii from February 8 to
December 17, 1941.
Sutherland, Richard: MacArthur’s Chief of Staff from 1938 through the end of the war.
Stimson, Henry: United States Secretary of War 1940-1945.
Vandenberg, Arthur: Republican Senator for Michigan 1928-1951. Arch- conservative
and the key political backer of MacArthur’s 1944 presidential bid.
Wainwright, Jonathan: Senior field commander of American and Filipino forces under
MacArthur. Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces in the Philippines following
MacArthur’s departure.
Willoughby, Charles: MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence from 1941 to 1951.

134
B: Full Text of Select Orders
Order from War Department to MacArthur instructing his evacuation
To be seen by decoding clerk only
With reference to the rapidly approaching reorganization of the ABDA Area and
also to the rather favorable report on the situation in Bataan in your No.341, as well as
your No. 344, regarding the build-up of resources in Mindanao: the president directs that
you make arrangements to leave Fort Mills and proceed to Mindanao. You are directed to
make this change as quickly as possible. The President desires that in Mindanao you take
such measures as will insure a prolonged defense of that region—this especially in view
of the transfer of President Quezon and his government to the Southern Philippines and
the great importance the President attaches to the future of the Philippines by prolonging
in every way possible the continuance of defense by United States troops and the
continuance of the active support of the Philippine Government and people. From
Mindanao you will proceed to Australia where you will assume command of all United
States Troops. It is the intention of the President to arrange with the Australian and
British Governments for their acceptance of you as commander of the reconstituted
ABDA Area. Because of the vital importance of your assuming command in Australia at
an early date, your delay in Mindanao will not be prolonged beyond one week and you
will leave sooner if transportation becomes available earlier. Instructions will be given
from here at your request for the movement of submarine or plane or both to enable you
to carry out the foregoing instructions. You are authorized to take with you your Chief of
Staff, General Sutherland. – Marshall (RG4R593)
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Reply by MacArthur to War Department regarding his evacuation
To be seen by decoding clerk only
I am deeply appreciative of the confidence in me that is implied in your 1078. As
my communications have shown I am completely in accord with the strategical
importance of the continued active support of the government and people and of the
consequent prolonged defense in the Philippines. It is my studied opinion that the
immediate movement directed is too sudden and abrupt in that it may result at this time in
the collapse of the Philippine Area with ensuing adverse effect on the entire theatre
before the means are available for counter offensive action from Australia. The lack of
visible support for the Philippines has created here a very difficult situation which I have
been able to market only through the peculiar confidence placed in me by the Filipino
people and army on the one hand and President Quezon on the other. The intent of the
enemy in this area is not yet clear. We may be approaching the stalemate of positional
warfare but it is possible that a major effort may soon be made to break my Bataan front;
his plans will shortly become evident. I am of the opinion that I can throw back an attack
if made with the troops now available locally and can then restabilize the situation. I am
not in possession of information regarding your developments in Australia but it is
apparent that there must be a great deal of organizational work accomplished in the
accumulation of forces and in the building of an sos before offensive action will be
possible. I am of the opinion that during the initial stages of that organizational effort I
can better accomplish the aims of the president set forth in your radio by temporary delay
in my departure. This would not prevent any immediate reorganization you may have in
mind nor my reassumption of command of the troops in the far east at this time; it would
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merely permit me temporarily to maintain my headquarters here until the psychological
time to leave. I earnestly urge that you accept my advice as to the timing of this
movement. I know the situation here in the Philippines and unless the right moment is
chosen for this delicate operation, a sudden collapse might occur which would carry with
it not only the people but the government. Rightly or wrongly, these people are
depending upon me now not only military but civically and any idea that might develop
in their minds that I was being withdrawn for any other purpose than to bring them
immediate relief could not be explained to their simple intelligence. At the right time I
believe they will understand it but if done too soon and too abruptly it may result in a
sudden major collapse. Please be guided by me in this matter. With regard to the actual
movement I deem it advisable to go to Mindanao by combined use of surface craft and
submarine and then to destination by air, further movement by submarine being too time
consuming. A flight of three B24s or B17s will be able to fight through if intercepted. To
set up the transportation will require a period of time that will probably suffice to make
essential psychological and physical adjustments here. advise the navy that no repeat no
fuel is available for a submarine. -MacArthur (RG4R93)

Medal of Honor Citation for Douglas MacArthur
Rank and organization: General, U.S. Army, commanding U.S. Army Forces in
the Far East. Place and date: Bataan Peninsula, Philippine Islands. Entered service at:
Ashland, Wis. Birth: Little Rock, Ark. G.O. No.: 16, 1 April 1942. Citation: For
conspicuous leadership in preparing the Philippine Islands to resist conquest, for gallantry
and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against invading Japanese
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forces, and for the heroic conduct of defensive and offensive operations on the Bataan
Peninsula. He mobilized, trained, and led an army which has received world acclaim for
its gallant defense against a tremendous superiority of enemy forces in men and arms. His
utter disregard of personal danger under heavy fire and aerial bombardment, his calm
judgment in each crisis, inspired his troops, galvanized the spirit of resistance of the
Filipino people, and confirmed the faith of the American people in their Armed Forces. Full Citation for Medal of Honor, Douglas MacArthur
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C: A Partial Glossary of Terms
ABDACOM: American British Dutch Australian Command. A loose and
ultimately short-lived conglomeration of Allied military forces in the Western Pacific.
Formed January 1, 1942, the command effectively ceased to exist following the
destruction of the combined ABDA fleet under Karel Doorman at the Battle of the Java
Sea on February 27, 1942.
AGWAR: Adjutant General – War Department.
Cable (Cablegram): A telegraph message sent via undersea cable.
FEAF: (United States) Far East Air Force
Fifth Columnist: A member of an organized group within a country working actively for
the benefit of the country’s enemies.
Front: A roughly defined area of close combat created when opposing armies
meet.
G-#: A headquarters element with a mission identified by uniform numerical
designation. For field-grade commands, the element’s designation is S-#.
G-1 (S-1): Personnel
G-2 (S-2): Intelligence
G-3 (S-3): Operations and Training
G-4 (S-4): Logistics
G-5 (S-5): Civil-Military Operations
G-6 (S-6): Signal Operations
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GHQ: General Headquarters. The command, logistical, and organizational center
of a formation led by a General. GHQ SWPA was the command element for the entire
Allied operation in the Southwest Pacific.
Pursuit (Aircraft): An aircraft intended to intercept and defeat other aircraft in the
air. “Fighter”
PT Boat: Patrol-Torpedo Boat. A small, fast class of boats used primarily for
coastal action by the US Navy during WWII.
Radiogram: A written message transmitted by radio.
SWPA: The name given to the overall Allied military command of the Southwest
Pacific area. Created on April 18, 1942 with General Douglas MacArthur at its head its
five subordinate commands were Allied Land Forces, Allied Air Forces, Allied Naval
Forces, United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA), and United States Army
Forces in the Philippines (which ceased to exist after the fall of Corregidor).
Theatre: A broad (usually geographic) region in which military action is
occurring. Usually distinct from other theatres in terms of geography and combatants.
USAFFE: United States Forces – Far East. A formation representing American
and Filipino forces in the South Pacific which effectively supplanted the old Philippine
Department upon the federalization of its forces on July 26, 1941.
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